

THE THEISM OF NYAYA-VAISESIKA

**ITS ORIGIN
&
EARLY
DEVELOPMENT**

C. BULCKE, S. J.

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Its Origin and Early Development

by
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“ ταῦτα χρή καὶ περὶ θεοῦ διανοεῖσθαι . . . διότι
πάση θνητῇ φύσει γινόμενος ἀθεώρητος ἀπ’ αὐτῶν
τῶν ἔργων θεωρεῖται ” (De mundo, 6).

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PREFACE

This monograph is a study of the origin and evolution of Theism in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The disquisitions on the existence and nature of God by its various exponents up to Vācaspati Miśra of the ninth century A.D. have been analyzed in detail.

Of set purpose I have avoided all reference to Western philosophy and have endeavoured, critically yet with sympathy, to propound the system as understood and taught in the school itself, even when its opponents' position has perhaps been misrepresented.

The introductory chapter contains the characteristic features of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the chronology of the texts and biographical notes on the authors. The second and third chapters deal respectively with the epistemology and metaphysics of the system as a whole. The bibliography is not exhaustive. Further references to works consulted will be found in the foot-notes. Special mention must be made of Professor H. Jacobi's excellent book: 'Die Entwicklung der Gottesidee bei den Indern', and of Dr. G. Jha's translations.

I am particularly grateful to the Rev. J. Bayart, S.J., Professor of Indian Religions, St. Mary's Theological College, Kurseong. Without his guidance and encouragement this book would never have been undertaken. More than four years have elapsed since these pages were written. It has not been possible for me to examine publications referring to the present subject, which may have appeared in the meantime.

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THE THEISM OF NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA

ITS ORIGIN AND EARLY DEVELOPMENT

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

(1) CHIEF CHARACTERISTICS OF NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the theism of which we have to study, reflects a more purely scientific and philosophical attitude than the other classical systems. The two Mīmāṃsās are based on Revelation, explaining the ritual of the Brāhmaṇas and systematizing the theology of the Upaniṣads; Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophy is eminently religious, being first and foremost a doctrine of liberation; it can be traced already in the earliest Upaniṣads. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, however, seems to belong to a secular school of thought and has no immediate connection, either with Vedic literature or with tradition.¹

The sūtras of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika already show a certain interdependence, for they complete each other in many respects. From the subsequent works of both systems it is evident that they developed together, borrowing from each other as they grew.

Vaiśeṣika deals chiefly with physics and metaphysics. Its doctrine of the six categories (the seventh was added only later), which embrace all reality, is the chief characteristic of the system. 'Therefore it is not the wish to discriminate soul from that which is not soul, ego from non-ego, but it is the theoretical desire for a correct classification and system of definition which has been the starting-point of the Vaiśeṣika system.'² Its atomism may be described as a *via media* between the Aupaniṣada abiding transcendental reality of the Absolute and the Buddhistic continual flux of phenomena.³

Nyāya, on the other hand, is primarily a system of logic and dialectics. M. R. Bodas even goes as far as to say that the philosophical views of the author are introduced in the sūtras as an illustration of his method, and come in as digressions rather than as inseparable parts of the system.⁴

Subsequent authors of both systems have combined the logical doctrine of Nyāya with the physics and metaphysics of Vaiśeṣika. The first commentary on the *Nyāya-Sūtras* already knows and applies the Vaiśeṣika theory of the six categories,⁵ and Praśastapāda, the first Vaiśeṣika author after the sūtras, borrows much from Nyāya and shows a great progress in his treatment of logic, especially in his analysis of the principles of inference. The next Naiyāyika, Uddyotakara, incorporated his results and gave back to Nyāya the lead in logical doctrine. From then onwards both systems, although retaining their individual characteristics, became more

¹ Cf. H. Jacobi, *Zur Frühgeschichte der Ind. Phil.*, Sitz. Königl. Ak. Wiss., XXXV, 1911.

² B. Faddegon, *The Vaiśeṣika System*, p. 12.

³ Cf. A. B. Keith, *I.L.A.*, p. 16.

⁴ Cf. Intr. to *Tarka Saṃgraha*, Bombay S.S., 1918, pp. XIV-XV.

⁵ N.Bh., 1, 1, 5 and 1, 1, 9. Cf. H. Jacobi, *Die indische Logik*, p. 479.

and more similar. This tendency culminates in the syncretic works, the first of them being the *Nyāya-Sāra* in the tenth century.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika seems to have had a more intimate connection with Yoga¹ than with the other classical systems. We already have a manifestation of this in the section of the *Nyāya-Sūtras* that treats of Yoga (4, 2, 38-48). Then there is the fact that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika borrowed its theism from Yoga.

It is beyond the scope of this work to enter into the many discussions about the origin of both schools and the identification of Nyāya with Ānvikṣaki.²

(2) TEXTS AND AUTHORS.

Although the *Sūtras* belong to a later date, both Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika must have been in existence in the second century B.C. It seems difficult to fix upon a more definite date.³

The *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras* are generally admitted to have preceded those of Nyāya and may perhaps be put in the first century A.D. They are ascribed to KAṆĀDA (literally: atom-eater), a nickname referring to his atomic theory. Praśastapāda mentioned that his family name was Kaśyapa and that he pleased Maheśvara by his austerities. This indirect testimony, however, does not allow us to assert that Kaṇāda was a Śaiva. We find no trace of theism in his work.

The *Nyāya-Sūtras* cannot be assigned to an earlier period than the second century A.D. and may possibly belong to a later date. Their author is said to be GAUTAMA, also called Akṣapāda. This epithet seems to be a nickname, 'one whose eyes are directed to his feet'.⁴ About his religion and that of his first commentator, Vātsyāyana, we know nothing. The theism of Gautama is not undisputed, and his theistic sūtras, which have been the starting-point of theism in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, have been the subject of many interpretations.

VĀTSYĀYANA, the author of the *Nyāya-Bhāṣya*, was, according to S. C. Vidyabhusana, born in the Deccan (H.I.L., p. 117). He criticizes, and therefore must have come after, Nāgārjuna but it is certain that he lived before Vasubandhu and Dignāga,—most probably in the fourth century. Although undoubtedly a theist, he does not attempt to prove the existence of God. His description of the nature of God, which represents the first attempt to incorporate theism into Nyāya, has been borrowed from Yoga.

Whilst the *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* closely follows the *Nyāya-Sūtras*, the work of PRAŚASTAPĀDA is an independent systematization of Vaiśeṣika and does not tally with the usual signification of Bhāṣya. It classifies the main topics under the six categories and is also called *dravyādi-ṣaṭ-padārtha-bhāṣya* or *padārtha-dharma-saṃgraha*. We do not find any reference to

¹ Cf. G. N. Kaviraja, Sar. Bh. Studies, III, p. 84.

² *Vaiśeṣika* originated from an old Mīmāṃsā school according to S. Dasgupta (H. I. Ph., I, pp. 280-2, for objections of Winternitz, cf. Gesch. der Ind. Lit., III, p. 652); according to H. Jacobi it developed from Lokāyata (Entw., p. 45, for objections of Winternitz, cf. o.c., III, p. 448 n.). *Nyāya* is said to originate from some Mīmāṃsā school (Keith, I.L.A., p. 10, Dasgupta, H.I.Ph., I, p. 276), from the early debates referred to in the Upaniṣads (Winternitz, o.c., III, pp. 462-3, S. Vidyabhusana, H.I.L., p. 23), from Āyurveda schools (Dasgupta, o.c., II, p. 401) or from a Sāma-Veda school (E. Windisch, Über das Nyāya-Bhāṣya, Leipzig, 1888). For identification of Nyāya with Ānvikṣaki: S. Vidyabhusana (o.c., p. 7) and S. Dasgupta (o.c., I, p. 273), against H. Jacobi (Entw., p. 42), A. B. Keith (o.c., pp. 11-12), Winternitz (o.c., III, p. 417).

³ Cf. Keith, o.c., pp. 10ff. Randle, Ind. Logic, p. 16.

Cf. Keith, o.c., p. 20.

an earlier Bhāṣya on the *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras*. Prof. Jacobi (Entw., p. 44) suggests that the development of Nyāya may be the cause of this; both systems being similar there was no need of a separate commentary on the somewhat antiquated *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras*. Praśastapāda's earliest probable date is the fifth century (cf. Keith, I.L.A., p. 27); he is indebted to Dignāga (early fifth century) but lived before (Mati-) Candra and Uddyotakara (seventh century). He was a Śaiva and is also the first theistic author of *Vaiśeṣika*. He ascribes the periodic process of creation to the wish of Maheśvara, but makes no attempt to describe the nature of God or to prove His existence. Theism is not treated as an integral part of his philosophical system; consequently the *Daśa-padārtha-śāstra* of (Mati-) Candra, based on Praśastapāda, ignores it altogether. This short treatise, a forerunner of the later summaries, was written about the end of the sixth century and is preserved in a Chinese version. Its translation, by H. Ui, contains no reference whatever to a Supreme Being, neither does it give us any indication as to the religious beliefs of (Mati-) Candra.

The next author of *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, UDDYOTAKARA, is of primary importance in the history of theism, as he is the first to give formal proofs of the existence of God. His work, the *Nyāya-Vārtika*, is a commentary on the *Nyāya-Bhāṣya*, wherein he replies to the attacks made by Dignāga. As Uddyotakara is mentioned by the poet Subandhu, the latter's work being referred to by Bāṇa in the *Harṣa-Carita*, he cannot have belonged to a period later than the first half of the seventh century (H.I.L., pp. 124-5). According to S. C. Vidyabhusana and Prof. Keith (I.L.A., p. 28) he was a contemporary of Dharmakīrti, and probably lived at Thaneśvara, where he may have enjoyed the patronage of Śrī Harṣa (629-644). Uddyotakara's family name was Bharadvāja; we have his own testimony that he was a Śaiva, since he calls himself Pāsupatācārya, a preceptor of the Śaiva Pāsupata sect.

We have no existing work on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika belonging to the period from Uddyotakara to VĀCASPATI MĪŚRA. Vācaspati Mīśra was a Brahman of Mithila and a Śaiva by faith; he wrote his work towards the middle of the ninth century. He is a very remarkable figure in the history of Indian philosophy and fully deserves the title of *Sarvatantra-svatantra*, 'master of all systems but reliant on no one of them in particular' (H.I.L., p. 135). Vācaspati wrote commentaries on *Mīmāṃsā* (*Nyāya-Kaṇikā*), *Vedānta* (*Bhāmātī*), *Sāṃkhya* (*Tattva-Kaumudī*), *Yoga* (*Tattva-Vaiśārādī*) and *Nyāya* texts.¹ If he did not write any book on *Vaiśeṣika*, this may be due to the fact that he considered this system almost identical with *Nyāya*. Of his two works on *Nyāya*, now known to us, *Nyāya-Sūci Nibandha* is an index to the *Nyāya-Sūtras*, whilst his *Nyāya-Vārtika-Tātparyā-Tīkā* is a very important commentary on the treatise of Uddyotakara. It is on his proof of the existence of God that the later theism of the school was built. His conception of the divine nature has also been accepted by later *Naiyāyikas*. With him, therefore, ends the first phase of *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* theism.

Although Vācaspati Mīśra is the last noteworthy figure in the history of the origin and early development of *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* theism, a brief reference to subsequent authors before the advent of the modern school of *Nyāya* (*Navya Nyāya*) might be welcome. Among the works of the tenth century, the *Nyāya-Sāra* of Bhāsarvajña² represents the first syncretic text-book of *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*. It shows a greater influence of *Yoga*,

¹ For more particulars cf. G. N. Kaviraja, *Sar. Bh. Studies*, III, pp. 98-102.

² Cf. *ib.*, pp. 81-93.

Śaivism and Bhakti-ideology than the other works of the school. The first commentary on Praśastapāda, after an interval of at least four centuries, is the *Vyomavati* by Vyomaśiva-ācārya. This commentator is said to have preceded Udayana and may therefore have lived towards the middle of the tenth century. Śrīdhara, a contemporary of Udayana, wrote, among several works on other systems,¹ a commentary on Praśastapāda, called the *Nyāya-Kandalī*. His proof of the existence of God is remarkably clear and concise. At the end of his book, he gives a few biographical details, where he says that he belongs to the village of Bhurīṣṭī (Bengal).

The most important Naiyāyika of the tenth century is Udayana, a Śaiva born in Mithila. He wrote commentaries on Gautama (the *Nyāya-Pariśiṣṭa*), Praśastapāda (the *Kiraṇāvalī*) and Vācaspati (the *Nyāya-Vārtika-Tātparya-Pariśuddhi*). His short *Lakṣaṇāvalī* is an independent work on Vaiśeṣika. In his *Āmatattva-Viveka* (or *Bauddha-Dhikkāra*) he defends the existence of a permanent soul against the Buddhists. This work also contains a discussion on theism and on the authority of the Vedas (pp. 825-935). His most famous book, however, is the *Nyāya-Kuṣumāñjali*, entirely devoted to the proofs of the existence of God.² This book made theism one of the principal tenets of the school and has been the subject of many commentaries.

A last author of *Prācīna Nyāya* is Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, a Śaiva from Kashmir, who probably also belongs to the tenth century. He quotes Vācaspati and is mentioned by Deva Sura (1088-1169). His work, the *Nyāya-Maṇjari*, is an independent work of Nyāya, based on the *Nyāya-Sūtras*. To be complete we must still mention Śivāditya, the first syncretic author who bases his teaching on the Vaiśeṣika system. His *Saptapadārthi*, which mentions Īśvara only once, was commented upon by many subsequent writers. He seems to have written another book, the *Lakṣaṇamālā*. He belongs probably to the eleventh century.

CHAPTER II

EPISTEMOLOGY

The following short sketch of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is necessarily incomplete as it is meant only to enable readers, unacquainted with the system, to follow our exposition of its theism and to form a correct appreciation of the results achieved. We have already seen how, from the time of Praśastapāda and Uddyotakara, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika become more and more *similar*. Since Uddyotakara is the first author who gives a formal proof of the existence of God and a systematic description of His nature, it will be sufficient for our purpose to describe this amalgamated Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and to mention only those differences between the two systems which have some connection with our subject.

Among the sixteen topics of Nyāya, the first two, *pramāṇa* and *prameya*, are by far the most important; the others belong more to the field of practical dialectics. *Prameya*, object of valid knowledge, includes the whole subject-matter of Vaiśeṣika; this will be dealt with in the next chapter. It is in

¹ Cf. *ib.*, p. 115.

² G. N. Kaviraja mentions another independent treatise on Nyāya by Udayana, the *Prabodha-siddhi*, probably compiled from Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara and Vācaspati. Cf. *ib.*, p. 113.

connection with the first topic of Gautama, *pramāṇa* or means of valid knowledge, that the epistemology of the system has developed; we need only mention a few outstanding features.¹

(1) KNOWLEDGE.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika considers cognition (*buddhi*) as synonymous with knowledge (*jñāna*), apprehension (*upalabdhi*), and cognizance or comprehension (*pratyaya*), and gives it the general meaning of reflexive consciousness of objects, exterior or interior. This knowledge is not a substantive modification of prakṛiti as in Sāṃkhya, neither is it the awareness of Vedānta nor even the act of cognition as in Mīmāṃsā or Buddhism; it is conceived in our system as a quality of the soul (soul, cognition and object being distinct) and consists in a series of transient cognitions.

Knowledge is a representation of reality, which will be valid in as far as it corresponds to that reality. This validity (or invalidity) is not known from the cognition itself (*svataḥ*) but from something other than the cognition (*parataḥ*), viz. by inference and ultimately by an appeal to facts. (Cf. I.L.A., p. 47.) False cognition is the result of misapprehension (*anyathākhyāti*); this may be due, in the case of sense-perception, e.g., to defective organs, too great a distance, and similar reasons. The realism of this school is brought out by its refutation of the other theories of error (esp. of the idealists and nihilists). (Cf. Randle, Ind. Logic, pp. 59ff.)

Nyāya subdivides cognition according to the following scheme:—

Buddhi	A. Anubhāva (Apprehension)	(a) <i>Pramā</i> (Right Appr.)	1. <i>Pratyakṣa</i> (Perception). 2. <i>Anumiti</i> (Inferred Knowledge). 3. <i>Upamiti</i> (Inferred Judgment). 4. <i>Śabda</i> (Verbal Knowledge).
		(b) <i>Apramā</i> (Wrong Appr.)	
		(c) <i>Samśaya</i> (Doubt)	
	B. <i>Smṛti</i> (Remembrance): Right or Wrong.		

Anubhāva is original or new apprehension, and is as such opposed to remembrance. The latter is produced through the union of the internal organ (*manas*) with that part of the soul in which the impression (*samskāra*) left behind by a former cognition inheres. To the four kinds of right or valid apprehension (*pramā*) correspond the four *pramāṇas*: perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), analogy or comparison (*upamāna*) and verbal testimony (*śabda*). Remembrance therefore lies outside the scope of the *pramāṇas*. Vātsyāyana still defines *pramāṇa* as an instrument of knowledge, but this ambiguity was removed by later definitions connecting *pramāṇa* with *pramā* only, *pramā* being defined as apprehension in accordance with reality (*yathārtho hi anubhāvaḥ pramā*, N. Kus., IV, 1). This definition clearly shows the realism of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Two of the above *pramāṇas*, viz. analogy and verbal testimony, were reduced to forms of inference by the Vaiśeṣikas. The later syncretic school, however, generally follows the Nyāya tradition.

The classical example of *Analogy* is the following. A townsman is told by a forester that a *gavaya* resembles a cow: on entering a forest, he sees

¹ For a more elaborate exposition cf. the works of A. B. Keith, H. N. Randle and S. C. Chatterjee (mentioned in the bibliography) on which our summary is based. English terminology is mostly borrowed from Prof. A. B. Keith.

an animal resembling a cow and realizes that it is a *gavaya*. Two factors are operating in the process: the authoritative knowledge imparted by the forester and the perception of similarity with the cow. The old school holds the first to be the immediate cause of the knowledge whereas the modern school lays greater stress on the second.

Verbal Testimony (śabda) is defined as the instructive assertion of a reliable person (*āpt-opadeśaḥ śabdaḥ*, N.S., 1, 1, 7). Examples of verbal testimony are the Vedic texts and the utterances of a man worthy of credence. In both cases the authoritativeness is based on the reliability of the speaker. We shall see later (Fourth Chapter) how gradually the authority of the Vedas was referred to God. Later Naiyāyikas divide śabda as follows: (1) *Vaidic* or scriptural testimony, viz. the Vedas which are the word of God and therefore valid in all respects; (2) *Laukika* or secular testimony which is valid only if given by a trustworthy person.

(2) PERCEPTION.

Perception (*pratyakṣa*) in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika includes both the process of perceiving and the knowledge resulting from it; the latter is, as every cognition, a transient quality of the soul.

It is only through the mediation of an internal organ called *manas* or mind that perception is possible: namely it arises from the union of the mind with the sense-organs when the latter are in contact with their respective objects, the mind being in its turn united to the soul. The assumption of an internal organ of perception explains how the soul, although all-pervading, cannot have many simultaneous perceptions. This would be possible if perception resulted from the direct union of soul and sense-organs. The mind, being atomic in dimension, cannot be in contact with more than one external sense-organ at a time. The mind is, moreover, the internal organ necessary for the perception of the qualities of the soul such as pleasure and pain. (Later Nyāya adds the soul itself as an object of internal perception, whilst according to Vaiśeṣika the soul is an object of inference.)

There are six organs of perception: five external (the *indriyas*: seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, and smelling) and one internal (the mind or *manas*). Of the external senses, four go to their objects; but sound comes to the ear. The contact between the organ and its object can take place in various ways: They are combinations of both direct and indirect conjunction (*saṃyoga*) and inherence (*samavāya*).¹

The above description applies to normal (*laukika*) perception. Later Nyāya distinguishes three kinds of supernatural or transcendental (*alaukika*) perception. The first two operate through association (*pratyāsatti*): (a) The sight of a jar reminds one of all other jars and gives the knowledge of the class to which they belong (*sāmānya lakṣaṇa*). (b) A piece of sandalwood may be too far to smell, but the sight of it may remind me so strongly of the smell that I may have the impression of actually perceiving it (*jñāna-lakṣaṇa*). To transcendental perception belongs finally the supernatural power of the ṛṣis, by which they perceive all things directly and which is due to the contact of their *manas* with the merit (*dharma*) they have acquired.

¹ The process of perception involves two stages: indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*) and determinate (*savikalpa*) perception. The latter only gives us the qualified object with all its characteristics.

(3) INFERENCE.

(a) *Gradual Development*.—Both sūtras deal with inference in a way which is characteristic. Kaṇāda is more interested in the process of inference itself: He defines inference as 'knowledge from a characteristic' (*laiṅgikam jñānam*); he does not formulate any syllogism and does not appeal to examples but enumerates the various real relations on which inference is based. Gautama, on the other hand, puts himself on the plane of practical dialectics: to him inference is a means of demonstration and consequently his attention is mainly directed to the syllogism, of which already he enumerates the five members accepted by the later school. He also says that inference is based on perception and is of three kinds: *pūrvavat* (from the earlier to the later), *śeṣavat* (from the later to the earlier), and *sāmānyatodrṣṭa* (from similarities). These very general terms have received various interpretations according to the gradual progress of the logical doctrine. The syllogism used to demonstrate the existence of God is of the *sāmānyatodrṣṭa* type; according to Vācaspati the knowledge resulting from such a syllogism is concerned with a general relation not subject to perception.¹

Vātsyāyana does not show any essential progress; his syllogism closely resembles that of Gautama, a reasoning from similar instances. Praśastapāda's Bhāṣya, on the other hand, marks a very definite advance towards the later doctrine of inference. Praśastapāda abandons the attempt of Kaṇāda to enumerate all the real relations which are the possible bases of inference in favour of a larger conception, viz. that of *sahacarya*, the invariable concomitance of reason and consequence (called *vyāpti* by later Nyāya). He also distinguishes between the inference for oneself which he considers as the real inference and the inference for others. The later is identified with the five-membered syllogism of the *Nyāya-Sūtras*.² It is impossible in a short sketch like this to follow the various developments of logical doctrine from Uddyotakara onwards; a short exposition of its final form as found in Gaṅgeśa and the syncretic school must suffice.

(b) *Inference for oneself* (*svārthānumāna*).³—Inference (*anumāna*) is defined as the instrumental cause of inferential knowledge (*anumiti*). The division of Praśastapāda in inference for oneself and for others has been kept. Inference for oneself is the real process of inference and is analyzed as follows: Seeing smoke on the mountain, I am reminded through association (*pratyāsatti*) of the connection between smoke and fire. I apply this connection to the smoke on the mountain: this leads me to the inference (*anumāna*) that there is fire on the mountain, and out of the inference immediately follows the knowledge of the inference (i.e. the inferential judgment or *anumiti*). The real cause of the obtained knowledge is the peculiar process called *parāmarśa* (reflexion or consideration), which consists of two cognitions, viz. that smoke is always accompanied by fire and that there is actually smoke on the mountain; in more general terms, that the reason is invariably connected with the consequence and that the reason is actually an attribute of the subject. This gives us the three terms necessary for an inference: the Subject or *pakṣa* (the mountain), the Consequence or *sādhya* (fire), and the Logical Reason or *hetu* (smoke). The reason may also be called *sādhana* (means) or *liṅga* (characteristic).

¹ Cf. A. B. Keith, I.L.A., p. 91.

² Prof. A. B. Keith ascribes the progress of Praśastapāda to the influence of Buddhist logic. Cf. I.L.A., pp. 97ff.

³ From here onwards we follow H. Jacobi, *Die indische Logik*, and O. Strauss, the chapter on Nyāya in *Indische Philosophie*.

(c) *Inference for others (parārthānumāna)* is the five-membered syllogism, by which the above inference is demonstrated.

- (1) Proposition—*Pratijñā* : There is fire on the mountain.
- (2) Reason—*Hetu* : Because there is smoke on it.
- (3) Example—*Udaharaṇa* : Wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen.
- (4) Application—*Upanaya* : Thus (having smoke) is the mountain.
- (5) Conclusion—*Nigamana* : Therefore it is thus (having fire).

This is often abbreviated as follows: There is fire on the mountain because there is smoke on it, as in the kitchen. The kitchen, in the above syllogism, is called the illustration (*dṛṣṭānta*). An illustration is a case where the reason is present and is connected with the consequence; in the kitchen, e.g., there is smoke accompanied by fire. Inference being the means of valid knowledge, the syllogism should be correct both *formaliter* and *materialiter*. The illustration is meant to guarantee this material correctness. The kitchen, e.g., is meant to illustrate the real concomitance of smoke (reason) and fire (consequence).

Sapakṣa (homologue) are all the cases where the consequence (fire) is undoubtedly present, e.g., the kitchen, sun, hot iron, etc., whether the reason (smoke) be present or not. Every illustration is therefore a homologue, but every homologue is not an illustration.

Vipakṣa (heterologue) includes all the counter-cases where the consequence (fire) is definitely absent, as for example, lakes, stones, etc.

(d) *Concomitance (vyāpti)*.—The material correctness of the above syllogism depends on the invariable concomitance of smoke and fire. The school remains faithful to Gautama's view that inference depends on perception when it asserts that invariable concomitance is known by perception. Through the first kind of transcendental perception (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) mentioned above, we perceive not merely the individual object (smoke, fire), but also its generality (*sāmānya*) which includes all the other objects of the same class (the generality of smoke and fire). Through the second kind of transcendental perception (*jñāna-lakṣaṇa*) we further realize the universal concomitance of the two. This invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) of reason (*vyāpya*) and consequence (*vyāpaka*) must exist independently of any conditions (*upādhi*) and consequently admit of no exceptions (*vyabhicāra*). If there is a condition, the concomitance may become correct, provided mention be made of the condition. 'Wherever there is fire, there is smoke', e.g., is subject to the condition that the fuel be moist, and the correct concomitance reads: 'Wherever there is fire fed by wet fuel, there is smoke.' In most cases the concomitance may be formulated both positively and negatively and is called *anvaya-vyatirekī*. Positively (*anvaya*): wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen. Negatively (*vyatireka*): wherever there is no fire there is no smoke, as in the lake.

Only positive (*kevalānvayī*) is the concomitance which allows only positive illustrations: The jar can be named because it can be known; a negative illustration, something unknowable and unnamable, would be impossible, precisely because it is unknowable and unnamable.

Only negative (*kevala-vyatirekī*) is the concomitance for which only negative illustrations can be found. For instance only a negative illustration can be found for the reality expressed in the statement: 'Living organisms have souls because they possess animal functions.' To bring in a positive illustration of some particular thing that possesses animal functions and has a soul would be superfluous, for it is identical with the subject for which it is an illustration (viz. everything that has animal functions

and has a soul is at the same time a living organism). A correct illustration should always differ in some way from the subject.

(e) *Reason: correct (sadheta) and faulty (hetvābhāsa).*—An inference is tested by ascertaining the correctness of the reason. A correct reason enjoys the following qualities: (1) *Pakṣadharmatā*: the reason must be an attribute (*dharma*) of the subject (*pakṣa*). There must in reality be smoke on the mountain. (2) The reason may be found only in homologues (*sapakṣa*); (3) must be excluded from all heterologues (*vipakṣa*); (4) must not be contradicted by direct perception or verbal testimony; and (5) may not be counterbalanced by another reason. If one or more of these conditions are not fulfilled the reason is faulty.

One of the sixteen topics of Gautama's *Nyāya-Sūtras* is Fallacy or Faulty Reason (*hetvābhāsa*) of which he distinguishes and defines five kinds (N.S., 1, 3, 4ff). This theory of logical errors has been elaborated very much and has resulted in the following scheme:¹ the five-fold division does not, however, correspond to the enumeration of Gautama.

1. The Indeterminate Reason (*anaikāntika*) is subdivided into three species: the too general reason (*sādhāraṇa*) which is found in homologues and heterologues; the too restricted reason (*asādhāraṇa*) which occurs nowhere outside the subject itself and is not found even in the homologues; and the indefinite reason (*anupasaṃhāri*), that which is alleged of a subject which is so extensive as to preclude all illustrations, positive and negative.

2. The Contrary Reason (*viruddha*) is found only in heterologues and not among the homologues. Example: That animal is a horse because it has horns.

3. The Unreal Reason (*asiddha*): (a) Unreal in regard to the substratum (*āśrayāsiddha*), when the subject does not exist. Ex.: The sky-lotus is fragrant because it is a lotus. (b) Unreal in itself (*svarūpāsiddha*), when the reason is not an attribute of the subject. Ex.: The lake is a substance, because it has smoke. (c) Unreal as regards the concomitance (*vyāpyāsiddha*); in this case the concomitance is either conditional (*aupādhika*) or does not exist at all because the reason itself is a fiction: The mountain has fire because it has golden smoke.

4. The Counterbalanced Reason (*satpratipakṣa*) is one for which another unrefuted reason exists which proves the contrary of the consequence.

5. The Contradicted Reason (*bādhita*) is one which tries to prove a consequence the contrary of which is established by perception or verbal testimony.

CHAPTER III

METAPHYSICS

(1) CATEGORIES, SUBSTANCES AND QUALITIES.

(a) *THE CATEGORIES (padārtha).*—We have already seen that Vaiśeṣika is chiefly a doctrine of categories which aims at a complete classification of all reality. This treatment of the categories was adopted by Nyāya very early; both schools had therefore the same realistic conception of the universe. Their chief opponents in this point were the Mādhyā-

¹ Cf. A. B. Keith, o.c., pp. 144ff.

mika school of nihilism (*śūnyavāda*) which denies all reality and later the idealism (*vijñānavāda*) of Aśaṅga and Vasubandhu which admits only the reality of our mental acts.¹

The first three categories of Substance, Quality and Motion form a distinct group. Kaṇāda applies to them only the term object (*artha*); later Nyāya keeps this distinction when it groups these three categories under the term existence (*sattā*).

SUBSTANCE (*dravya*) is not directly defined but is described as the substratum of qualities and motion and as the inherent cause of a product.

QUALITY (*guṇa*) is that which inheres in substances, does not possess qualities itself and is not the immediate cause of conjunction and disjunction of substances. The last characteristic is added to distinguish quality from MOTION (*karman*) which also inheres in substances and does not possess qualities but is the cause of the conjunction and disjunction of substances. A further distinction between quality and motion consists in the fact that some qualities reside permanently in their substances whereas motion is transient in all its varieties. It is destroyed by subsequent conjunction or by the evanescence of its substratum. Motion is of five kinds, already enumerated by Kaṇāda (V.S., 1, 1, 7): throwing up, throwing down, expansion, contraction, and going; the last kind is meant to include any case not designated by the others.

The above categories together with the next three of Generality, Particularity and Inherence form the group called Actuality or Being (*bhāva*) and stand apart from the seventh and last category of Negation or Non-Being (*abhāva*). Generality and particularity were not considered by Kaṇāda to exist apart from the intellect (V.S., 1, 2, 3) and inherence is mentioned by him only as the relation between cause and effect (V.S., 10, 2, 1); later on, however, all three were considered as eternal real entities.

GENERALITY (*sāmānya*) was originally synonymous with *sādharmya*, the common properties found in certain groups of substances, qualities and motions. Later it came to mean a general eternal characteristic actually existing, inhering in more than one substratum, and the object of transcendental perception. Each generality is *one* in all its substrata. It inheres only in the three categories of substance, quality and motion; the highest generality (*param sāmānyam*) is consequently existence (*sattā*), an attribute common to these three categories. Lower generality (*aparam sāmānyam*) includes substance, quality, motion; earth . . . colour . . . throwing upwards . . . ; cow, jar, cloth, etc. Lower generality may also be a class concept (*jāti*) but is not synonymous with it; the latter term applies only to natural self-contained groups as cows, jars, etc. The universal concepts of elemental and corporeal substances (cf. *infra*), for instance, are not class concepts because they overlap: ether is an element but is not corporeal, whereas the internal organ is corporeal but not an element.

PARTICULARITY (*viśeṣa*) at first meant 'the totality of properties which are typical for one category when compared to another' (H. Faddegon, o.c., p. 12). The word has given Vaiśeṣika its actual name. In the developed system Viśeṣa is a reality inhering in the eternal atoms and the other simple substances, distinguishing them from one another. Whenever something is composite it is particularized by its components; for simple substances this is brought about by the category of particularity.

¹ For this chapter cf. the works of A. B. Keith, B. Faddegon and O. Strauss mentioned in the Bibliography.

INHERENCE (*samavāya*) is the relation between things which cannot exist separately. Since inherence is the basis of the relation between cause and effect, it is uncaused itself and therefore eternal. To Vaiśeṣika it is an object of inference, whereas Nyāya makes it the object of a special perception. Although inherence is one, being the same wherever it appears, five different cases are enumerated; the relation between a whole and its parts; between substance and quality; substance and motion; generality and the individual; particularity and the substance in which it inheres. Inherence is different from the quality conjunction (*saṃyoga*), the latter being able to exist only in things which are normally separate.

Udayana is the first to call NON-BEING (*abhāva*) a category. It may result from the negation of identity and is then called reciprocal non-being (*anyonyābhāva*), e.g., 'this jar is not a carpet'. Non-being may also be based on the negation of a correlation (*saṃsarga*); in that case it is subdivided into antecedent (*prāgabhāva*), consequent (*dhvaṃsābhāva*) and absolute non-being (*atyantābhāva*). The knowledge of non-being depends on the knowledge of the positive counterpart (*pratiyogin*): the jar is the positive counterpart of its antecedent and consequent non-being.

(b) **THE NINE SUBSTANCES.**—Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not accept the manifold substances of Sāṃkhya-Yoga, but tries to discover and classify the ultimate reality necessary to explain our experience. Nine species of substances are distinguished: the four kinds of atoms or atomic substances (earth, water, fire and air), ether, time and space, finally the soul and the internal organ called mind (*manas*). The last is atomic in dimension and forms together with the four kinds of atoms and their products the class of corporeal substances (*mūrta-dravya*); they have infinitesimal or limited dimensions and are consequently capable of movement. The four remaining substances (soul, ether, time and space) have illimited magnitude; they are consequently all-pervading and can enter into conjunction or contact with the corporeal substances.

Ether and the four kinds of atoms constitute the class of Elemental Substances (*bhūta-dravya*). Each of them has a special relation to one of the five specific qualities perceptible by one of the external sense-organs only; touch is especially referred to air, colour to fire, taste to water, smell to earth and sound to ether. The elements are also the material out of which the corresponding sense-organ has been made; thus the organ of smell is made of earth atoms, the organ of hearing is constituted of ether, etc. All products are transient but the elements themselves, together with the other substances are all eternal. Eternal is defined already by Kaṇāda (V.S., 4,1,1,) as existing and uncaused. The system is therefore dualistic or rather pluralistic and conceives the substances as independent in their very being of Īśvara or of any other monistic substratum. A knowledge of the substances, soul and mind, is of special importance for our study; these subjects will accordingly be dealt with separately.

The four *Atomic Substances* (earth, water, fire, and air) are super-sensible, infinite in number and have no magnitude or extension. Their dimension is called absolute minuteness (*anuvā* or *pārimañḍalyam*). The qualities eternally inhering in them can only be perceived in their perceptible products. *Ether* (*ākāśa*) or physical space is not directly perceptible but is inferred by the fact that the quality sound must inhere in a substance. Although one only, the ether is differentiated by its adjuncts in the cavity of the ear and forms the organ of hearing. *Time* (*kāla*) and mathematical *Space* (*dis*) are eternal, all-pervading, independent realities which are inferred to explain our knowledge of temporal and spatial relations. They are the only substances which have specific qualities.

It will be noticed that none of these substances are directly perceptible except the products of the atoms and, according to some, the soul, as will be explained later.

(c) THE QUALITIES.—The Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras enumerate seventeen qualities, but from Praśastapāda onwards the complete list contains twenty-four. They are variously classified according to their perceptibility, their causes, their products, their inherence in material and spiritual substances, etc. The most important distinction is that between specific and generic qualities. Specific qualities (*viśeṣa guṇa*) inhere only in certain substances and serve the purpose of differentiating their substratum, whilst the generic qualities (*sāmānya guṇa*) reduce their substratum to a common basis (*sāmānyāya svāśraya-sādharmyāya guṇāḥ na svāśraya-viśeṣāya*, N.Ka., p. 96).

Among the sixteen specific qualities nine belong to the soul and will be considered later. The others inhere in the elemental substances and their products; they are: colour, taste, smell, touch and sound; viscosity (*sneha*) and natural fluidity (*dravatva*).¹ They are eternal in the eternal substances and are transmitted to all their products; the latter can have no other specific qualities besides those of their ultimate material cause. A jar, e.g., has all the specific qualities of its cause clay, which are ultimately those of the atoms out of which it is made.

There are eleven² generic qualities: the five belonging to all substances; distance (*paratva*) and nearness (*aparatva*), both in space and time; artificial fluidity (*naimittikam dravatvam*) and gravity (*gurutva*); velocity (*vega*) and elasticity (*sthiti-sthāpaka*).³ We shall describe only the five generic qualities which belong to all substances, material and immaterial, and are consequently attributed to the soul and God also. They are: Number, Dimension, Individuality, Conjunction, and Disjunction. All of them are real entities; the last two are transient, the others are eternal in the eternal substances and transient in the products.

Number (*samkhyā*) is the instrumental cause of the use of the terms one, two, three . . . Unity stands apart from the other numbers; it is a reality independent of the intellect, eternal in the eternal substances, transient in the products. Duality and the other numbers are not absolute realities according to the prevalent opinion;⁴ they depend for their existence on a relating cognition (*apekṣā-buddhi*) which engenders them in the perceived objects. We first perceive two objects separately as two units and then through our relating cognition duality is produced and inheres in both objects; this is followed by the intellection containing the general notion of duality. The other numbers are similarly built up out of unities just as the material products are produced out of atoms. They

¹ The distribution of specific qualities among the eternal substances is the following: The nine specific qualities of the soul belong to the soul only, except for *saṃskāra* which also appertains to the internal organ and is its only specific quality. Smell belongs to the earth-atom only; taste to earth and water; colour to earth, water and fire; touch to earth, water, fire and air; sound to ether only, viscosity and natural fluidity to the water-atom only.

² Sixteen specific and eleven generic qualities make a total of 27 qualities whereas there are only 24 of them. This apparent confusion is due to the fact that fluidity being divided into natural and artificial fluidity is counted twice and the quality *saṃskāra* three times. The latter is a general term which includes velocity, elasticity and mental impression (*bhāvanā*), a specific quality of the soul and the internal organ.

³ They are distributed as follows: nearness, distance and velocity belong to all corporeal substances; artificial fluidity to earth and fire; gravity to earth and water.

⁴ In Nyāya schools, they are said to be revealed by cognition, but to exist independently of it. Udayana, however, has built one of his proofs for the existence of God on the assumption that duality, etc., are produced by knowledge.

all vanish, together with the transient relating cognition. This theory was first introduced into the school by Praśastapāda.

Dimension (parimāṇa) forms the base of measurement and is of four kinds: minute (*anu*), large (*mahat*), long (*dirgha*) and short (*hrasva*). Eternal dimensions are the extreme magnitude (*paramamahattva*) of the illimited substances (the soul including Īśvara, ether, space and time) and the absolute minuteness (*anutva* or *pārimaṇḍalyam*) of the atoms and the mind. The transient dimensions are best enumerated according to the process of production: a binary atom is still imperceptible, it possesses created minuteness (*anutva*) and shortness (*hrasvatva*); both are produced by the duality of the components. This duality itself is produced by the relating power of God's eternal intellect, who alone can perceive the atoms at the beginning of creation. The molecules have length (*dirghatva*) and largeness or limited magnitude (*mahattva*); this is caused by the triality of the three binary atoms out of which the molecules are composed. The triality of the molecules is due again to the relating intellect of Īśvara. (Cf. Pr. Bh., p. 471.) The dimensions of molecules are perceptible, together with the other specific qualities of the component atoms.

Individuality (prthaktva) or Separateness is the proximate cause of our separating one substance from another. It is different from the category of reciprocal non-being by the fact that it is real, not notional in character.

Conjunction (saṃyoga) is the contact of two substances which have been apart and *Disjunction (vibhāga)* the state of separation between things which have been united. Both are caused by motion, and consequently there can be no conjunction or disjunction between two all-pervading substances since neither of them can move. No author explains how the last two qualities apply to God.

(2) THE SOUL.

(a) Both Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika agreed, from the outset, with Sāṃkhya-Yoga in teaching the existence of innumerable individual souls, immaterial and eternal. Their chief opponents in this were the Buddhists who admitted only an impermanent, not wholly immaterial, self and the materialists who denied the existence of the soul altogether and regarded consciousness as a product of matter. The soul-theory is treated at length both by Kaṇāda and Gautama; their exposition has been completed by Praśastapāda's enumeration and explanation of the qualities of the soul, so much so that later authors have little to add to his description. We shall see in the next chapter that the name of Īśvara was originally not mentioned in this connection.

According to some Naiyāyikas¹ the soul is directly perceptible by means of the inner organ (*manas*) but even they have recourse to inference to prove its existence for those who deny this direct apprehension. The qualities of the soul such as knowledge, pleasure and pain must inhere in a substance which, by elimination, is proved to be the soul. Great stress is rightly laid on remembrance and on the oneness of consciousness, the 'I' (*aḥam*) to which all cognitions are referred and which proves the existence of an immaterial substance, different from the various sense-organs and the body. This argument also proves that there is only one soul in each body.

¹ Especially Uddyotakara, Vācaspati and Udayana. Uddyotakara, e.g. states: The soul, being the object of the cognition 'I', is an object apprehended by perception (*aḥam-pratyaya-viśayatvād ātmā tāvat pratyakṣaḥ*, N.V., p. 342).

'The sight of a certain object may, by reminding us of its taste, cause a modification in our organ of taste; from this we infer a single agent for both operations as one person looking through several windows' (*aneka-gavākṣ-āntargata-prekṣakavat*, Pr. Bh., p. 70). The plurality of individual souls is proved by the variety of experience and condition among men: one feels happy, another miserable (*vyavasthātaḥ*, V.S., 3, 2, 20). The number of them is said to be infinite and therefore the beginningless cycle of rebirth (*saṃsāra*) will never end, however many may reach liberation.

The soul is eternal (i.e. existing and uncaused) since it cannot be shown to consist of parts (just as the ultimate air-atom, cf. V.S., 3, 2, 5 and 2, 1, 13). Its former connection with a body is inferred from the feelings and instinctive actions of a child (N.S., 3, 1, 18-21). Moreover, the doctrine of rebirth is everywhere presupposed and is connected with the moral law of retribution, which is accepted as an axiom. We often see people suffer the consequences of actions they have never committed in this life and on the other hand many sin freely and are not punished in their present existence: these facts can only be explained by past sins and future retribution.

(b) The soul possesses the five generic qualities belonging to all substances: number, illimited dimension (*paramamahattva*), individuality, conjunction and disjunction. The quality conjunction is proved by the fact that knowledge, pleasure, pain, etc., are produced by the conjunction of soul and mind (*manas*). The quality disjunction is inferred from the cessation of these experiences.

The nine specific qualities of the soul are not unrelated among themselves: merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*) are the cause of pleasure (*sukha*) and pain (*duḥkha*). From these two arise desire (*icchā*) and aversion (*dveṣa*) which presuppose knowledge (*buddhi*) and find expression in activity (*prayatna*). This activity is either good or bad and again produces merit and demerit by means of a mental impression (*saṃskāra*), which is the last specific quality of the soul. This mental impression is also produced by any conscious act; and it explains remembrance, which is caused by the contact of the mind with that part of the soul where the impression of the former cognition inheres. All these qualities are caused and therefore none of them is eternal; all, except merit, demerit and *saṃskāra*, are internally perceived by means of the internal organ.

(c) In the exposition of the process of perception we have seen why the system assumes the existence of an internal organ or mind (*manas*). It is the intermediary between the senses and the soul, the instrument of internal perception and the explanation of memory and all other conscious acts which are caused by the contact of soul and mind. The latter is atomical in dimension and therefore eternal and imperceptible. Its only specific quality is *saṃskāra* or mental impression. The mind is not conscious, otherwise it would possess the body in common with the soul (Pr. Bh., p. 412). It never leaves the body except at the moment of death; the yogis, however, can despatch and recall their *manas* whenever and wherever they like (Pr. Bh., p. 671). Each soul possesses its own *manas* which accompanies it from birth to birth. The two are separated definitely on the attainment of liberation.

(d) Rebirth is caused by merit and demerit; as long as there is any deed (*karma*) to be rewarded or punished the soul is reincarnated. A necessary condition of liberation (*mokṣa*) is therefore the exhaustion of karma; but this does not seem to be its real cause. The *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras* ascribe liberation to merit (6, 2, 16) and to the knowledge caused by a special merit, where the *Nyāya-Sūtras* consider the knowledge of the sixteen topics to be the cause of *mokṣa* (1, 1, 1). *Praśastapāda* describes the gradual process

at greater length (each of the following stages causes the next): performance of meritorious acts, birth in a good family, desire for liberation, acquisition of the true knowledge of six categories from a qualified teacher, absence of all affections and desires which puts a stop to the production of new *karma* (i.e. merit and demerit), exhaustion of all previous *karma* by which the soul becomes seedless (*nirbīja*), finally liberation which consists in perfect tranquillity due to the non-production of a body, and which is comparable to the extinction of a fire, resulting from the consumption of all its fuel (*punaḥ śarīrādy-anutpattau dagdhendān-ānalavad-upaśamo mokṣa iti*, Pr. Bh., p. 644).

Liberation is consequently defined as the utter annihilation of pain (N.S., 1, 1, 22). It is an essential tenet of the system that knowledge or consciousness is a momentary quality of the soul, caused by the contact of soul and mind. Since the liberated soul is definitely free from all association with the body and the mind, it is also entirely unconscious; all pain and pleasure have ceased to exist and there remains only the perfect tranquillity (*upaśama*) of unqualified existence comparable to an extinguished fire. Reactions against this negative conception are not difficult to understand. In the tenth century, Bhasarvajña and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa conceived liberation as pleasurable consciousness.

(3) CAUSALITY.

(a) At the time of its origin the causality-theory of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika stood midway between the *satkāryavāda* of Sāṃkhya and the *Kṣaṇikavāda* of Buddhism. The latter holds that all things are momentary; the only reality is a perpetual flux of phenomena without a permanent substratum. Sāṃkhya, on the other hand, maintains that all phenomena and effects are only modifications (*pariṇāma*) of a permanent material cause, the relation between cause and effect being one of identity (*tādātmya*).¹ The effect exists before it is caused (*satkāryavāda*). All effects are eternal *dharma*s which belong to invisible *dharmīns* or substrata; the ultimate substratum being primary matter (*prakṛti* or *pradhāna*). Those effects exist equally before and after manifestation (*abhivyakti*).

To Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the effect (just as the Buddhist phenomenon) is something new which did not exist before (*asatkāryavāda*). But the substratum (just as the *prakṛti* of Sāṃkhya) is permanent; the eternal ultimate atoms out of which all things are made, do not change. The effect contains all the atoms of its material cause with their eternal specific qualities; these qualities are not produced but only manifested in the various perceptible products. The generic qualities of the effect, however, are new; they are caused by conjunction and disjunction, and by the generic qualification of the material cause; we have seen, e.g., how the duality and plurality inhering in the atoms produces the dimension of the molecules.

The ultimate material cause therefore remains the same, but a new effect can come into existence only after the evanescence of the proximate material cause; curds, e.g., are produced only after the destruction of the milk by a rearrangement of the component atoms (N.S., 3, 2, 16; N.Bh., 4, 1, 18). Between the new effect and its material cause there is an absolute difference (*atyanta-bheda*). The whole is something different from the parts (N.S., 2, 1, 30); the peculiar relation obtaining between them being one

¹ Vedānta will agree with this identity, but will deny the reality of the modification (*vivartavāda*).

of inherence: the effect inheres in the cause.¹ This was the angle from which the problem of causality was seen; the inherent cause consequently became of the utmost importance and the category of inherence originated from the peculiar relation between an effect and its material components. But inherence cannot be applied to efficient causes and their effects; the concept of causality was therefore broadened and made more comprehensive than that of inherence. Originally only two kinds seem to have been discriminated: the inherent cause (*samavāyi*) and other causes (*nimitta*), the latter referring primarily to the reason or motive behind a given activity (cf. Faddegon, o.c., pp. 139 and 214). Praśastapāda enumerates three kinds: inherent, non-inherent and operative; but the last two are not yet clearly and sharply discriminated (cf. B. Faddegon, o.c., pp. 138). In the early theistic texts, which we have to study, *kāraṇa* is used in a very general meaning. When a distinction is needed, the term *upādāna-kāraṇa* is used for material cause and *nimitta-kāraṇa* for efficient cause.

(b) The empirical view of causality in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika stands out very clearly in the definition of cause and effect. The cause (*kāraṇa*) is that which invariably and necessarily precedes the effect (*kārya-niyata-pūrva-vrtti*, cf. Tarkasaṃgraha, sect. 38), excluding all that does not directly contribute to the result (*anyathā-siddhi*). The question of the exclusion of accessory causes (*sahakāri*) was especially developed from the time of Gaṅgeśa (twelfth century) onwards. Accessory causes include, e.g. the stick with which the potter turns the wheel, the potter's father, etc. The effect (*kārya*) is defined as the consequence of that which constitutes the cause as cause. A more pregnant definition is the one of Anṇam Bhaṭṭa: 'An effect is the counterpart of an antecedent which dissolves into non-existence' or as Professor Keith translates it: 'the positive correlate of an anterior negation'.

Three kinds of causes are distinguished:

The inherent cause (samavāyi kāraṇa) can only be a substance. It is either the material out of which a product is made (the threads are the inherent or material cause of the carpet) or a substance in which a quality or a movement inheres (the carpet is the inherent cause of its colour, the soul is the inherent cause of its specific qualities). Causality is, as we have seen, first and foremost a relation of inherence (*samavāya*).

The non-inherent cause (asamavāyi kāraṇa) is either a quality or a movement which inheres in the inherent cause. The arrangement of the threads as a quality inheres in the threads, which are the inherent cause of the carpet, and thus the arrangement of the threads is the non-inherent cause of the carpet. An example of more indirect non-inherent cause is the following: the colour of the threads inheres in the threads (which are the inherent cause of the carpet), the colour of the carpet inheres in the carpet and thus the colour of the threads is the non-inherent cause of the colour of the carpet.

*The efficient or operative cause (nimitta kāraṇa)*²; it is not easy to find a satisfactory translation for this third category since it embraces all those causes that cannot be included under the two previous headings. It is subdivided into general efficient causes (*sādhāraṇa nimitta kāraṇa*) which

¹ The effect is different from and something more than the cause; the latter is therefore really inadequate and cannot account fully for the effect. The Sāṃkhya view, on the other hand, does not sufficiently explain the distinction between cause and effect, which is after all the very basis of the concept of causality.

² Prof. A. B. Keith translates *nimitta kāraṇa* as instrumental cause and *kāraṇa* as efficient or proximate cause.

include God, His knowledge, desire and activity; space and time; *adr̥ṣṭa* (i.e. merit and demerit) and special efficient causes which are innumerable. Among the latter are included the agent and the instrumental cause (*karana*), which by its operation (*vyāpāra*) produces the effect; thus the axe is the instrumental cause in cleaving the wood. From this classification it is clear how little importance was attached to intelligent efficient causality.

CHAPTER IV

THE PHILOSOPHICAL DEVELOPMENT OF EARLY INDIAN THEISM

The object of this chapter is to sketch briefly the philosophical development which ultimately led to the theism of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The first section considers the development of the concept of God. By this we do not mean the growth of the idea of God itself; there are, in the Varuṇa hymns of the R̥gveda sufficient proofs that the Aryans who wandered to India possessed a rather pure idea of a highest divinity.¹ Our aim is only to indicate the most important stages of philosophical progress which directly contributed to the concept of a personal, immaterial, Supreme Spirit.² Even a superficial reading of some Upaniṣads is sufficient to convince anyone how much speculation has preceded the classical philosophical systems. The *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, to give one example, enumerates many theories about the cause of the world, theories which were known several centuries before the Christian era. 'Time (*kāla*) or inherent nature (*svabhāva*), or necessity (*niyatī*) or chance (*yadṛcchā*) or the elements (*bhūta*) or a (female) womb (*yoni*) or a male person (*puruṣa*) are to be considered (as the cause); not a combination of these because of the existence of the soul (*ātman*). The souls who have followed after meditation and abstraction (*yoga*) saw the self-power (*ātma-śakti*) of God (*deva*) hidden in His own qualities (*guṇa*). He is the one that rules over all these causes from "time" to "the soul".'³

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika has borrowed its theism from Yoga. To prove this and to show the extent of the influence of Yoga, an exposition of its theism is given in the second section of this chapter. The last two sections analyze the development of theism in Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya respectively and prove that originally neither system was theistic. By this we do not mean that the existence of God was denied; but that His existence did not enter into the field of speculation. This was quite natural, as the primary object of Nyāya is Dialectics, whilst Vaiśeṣika may be characterized as a classification of the empirical world under the various categories.

¹ For other theistic tendencies in the R̥gveda, cf. S. Dasgupta, H.I.Ph., pp. 19-21.

² We are guided in this analysis by Prof. Jacobi's book, *Die Entwicklung der Gottesidee bei den Indern*. For a criticism of Jacobi's doctrine concerning the origin of the 'Soul-theory' cf. S. K. Belvalkar and R. D. Ranade. *Hist. of Indian Phil.*, II, Poona, 1927, pp. 430ff. Prof. Jacobi may indeed have been too definite in fixing dates and limits of philosophical evolution.

³ Sv. Up., 1, 2-3. Transl. R. E. Hume. *The 13 Princ. Up.*, Oxford U.P., 1921. For a slightly different transl. of these verses cf. J. W. Hamer, *Ein monotheistischer Traktat Altindiens*, Gotha, 1931.

(1) THE CONCEPT OF GOD.

(a) *Vedic Literature.*

The pre-requisite for a correct philosophical concept of God, viz. an essential distinction between matter and spirit, cannot be found in early Vedic literature. This may at first seem surprising, considering the many speculations about *brahman* and *ātman*. The neutral word *brahman*¹ occurs in the R̥gveda, where it means the inspired word, the hymn, prayer, sacred knowledge. Later on, in the Brāhmaṇas, it means the sacrifice, the knowledge of the sacrifice, etc. It seems to stand for the highest concept reached at the successive periods.

On the other hand, the universe was often conceived, already in the R̥gveda (X, 90) as a man, a cosmic *puruṣa*, to whom a soul, or *ātman* was ascribed.² This *ātman* was finally identified with *brahman*, which gradually had come to signify the impersonal transcendental entity constituting the ultimate essence of the world and also the very essence of each individual being. The individual soul of man³ is not conceived as a permanent immaterial substance, a possible substratum for personality. Consequently the early Upaniṣads deny personal consciousness after death.⁴ The end of the Vedic period presents us therefore with pantheism; philosophical theism seems more remote than ever. Nevertheless late Vedic literature contains the first step towards an essential distinction between matter and spirit. In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, e.g., Yājñavalkya describes the pantheistic *ātman* as a mass of knowledge (*viññānaghana*, 2, 4, 12), as a knowing soul (*prājña ātmā*, 4, 3, 12), or more explicitly still: 'It is, as is a mass of salt, without inside, without outside, entirely a mass of taste, even so, verily is this soul, without inside, without outside, entirely a mass of knowledge' (*ayam ātmā 'nantaro 'vāyhaḥ kṛtsnaḥ prajñāghana*, 4, 5, 13). The intelligence of each individual, however, is not yet conceived as an attribute of an eternal individual soul; on the contrary, it is but an impersonal participation of the cosmic intelligence.⁵

(b) *The Verse Upaniṣads.*

An essential and clear distinction between matter and spirit is found everywhere in the Verse Upaniṣads.

They contain also another important step towards philosophical theism, viz. a clear, although still inadequate, distinction between the individual and the Supreme Soul. This appears for the first time in the *Kāthaka Upaniṣad*, where other theistic elements can be found. The relation between the individual and the Supreme Soul has, however, not yet taken a definite shape. Salvation can only be gained at the price of identification with the universal self, and yet the individual liberated soul is said to reach the heaven of Viṣṇu (*pāram āpnoti tad viṣṇoḥ paramam padam*, 1, 3, 9). The *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* reveals the same theistic tendency. In several passages the individual self (*puruṣa*, *jīva*, *dehī*) is clearly distinguished from the Supreme Brahman; but again in others, both are identified. Rudra is

¹ Cf. Hume, o.c., p. 14 and H. Jacobi, o.c., pp. 4-5.

² Cf. Hume, o.c., p. 23.

³ Cf. A. B. Keith. The Rel. and Phil. of the Veda and Up., Harvard U.P., pp. 551ff.

⁴ Cf. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.*, 2, 4, 12 and 4, 5, 13.

⁵ Cf. Jacobi, o.c., p. 15. Cf. also *Chāndogya Up.*, 6, 3, 2-3.

repeatedly addressed as a personal merciful highest *ātman*, yet the philosophical system of essential monism is not abandoned.¹

(c) *Soul-theory universally accepted.*

From this period onwards the theory of a personal, immortal and immaterial soul is steadily gaining ground. All philosophical systems² save Lokāyata and Buddhism, accept the new theory of the soul (*ātmavāda*). The latter retains the concept of a not completely immaterial soul, a *psyche*. The materialism of the traditional Lokāyata does not admit any soul at all: the only reality being the four elements and their combinations. Some doubt may arise regarding the position of Bādarāyaṇa, mainly because Śaṅkara has projected his *māyāvāda* into the *Brahma-Sūtras*. But Bādarāyaṇa does teach that the individual soul is eternal (2, 3, 17) and different from Brahma (2, 1, 22 and 2, 3, 43); salvation according to him consists in union but not in identification with Brahma (4, 1. 19 and 4, 4, 4-22 esp. 8).³

This, however, does not mean that philosophical theism has already prevailed. The speculations of the Brāhmaṇas had stripped the Vedic deities of all real power. Consequently, we find at first a theoretical atheism in post-Vedic times. The existence of gods as higher beings is not denied; denied (or ignored at least) is the existence of an absolute personal God, Maker and Ruler of this world. In this sense Sāṃkhya, Jainism, Buddhism and the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā are atheistic.⁴

But along with this theoretical atheism, there was at that time, as there had always been, a practical theism. Śiva and Viṣṇu gradually acquired the first place in the worship of masses (cf. the theistic tendencies in the Verse Upaniṣads already referred to above). These religious practices found philosophical expression in the framework of the Soul-theory (*ātmavāda*). After the fundamental distinction between matter and spirit, God could be conceived as special spirit, a highest spiritual soul. This was first achieved in the Yoga-system.

(2) THEISM IN YOGA.

The date of the Yoga-Sūtra is the subject of much discussion. Its author has been identified with Patañjali, the grammarian of the second century B.C.; many scholars, however, reject this identification.⁵ Fortunately we need not rely on this identification to be able to state that Vātsyāyana borrowed much of his description of the attributes of God (and possibly Gautama his theism) from a Yoga school of thought, because nobody doubts that the Yoga-system itself is very old.⁶ Prof. Jacobi who puts the Yoga-Sūtras in the fifth century of the Christian era, admits the existence

¹ Cf. Jacobi, o.c., p. 23, and Belvalkar-Ranade, Hist. Ind. Ph., II, p. 309. Few will agree with the statement of J. W. Hauer (o.c., p. 26) that the Sv. Up. teaches an absolute pure monotheism.

² Cf. Dasgupta, H.I.Ph., I, p. 78.

³ Cf. Jacobi, o.c., p. 22 and Thibaut, S.B.E., Vol. 34, pp. XCVII—C. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, too, in his commentary, *The Ślokavārtika*, teaches the doctrine of a personal and eternal soul. Su. V, Section 18, vv. 7ff.

⁴ Cf. Jacobi, o.c., p. 26.

⁵ Dr. M. D. Shastri rejects the identification for historico-philological reasons; cf. Saraswati Bhavana Studies, Vol. X, p. 63. Cf. also J. Woods, *The Yoga System of Patañjali*, pp. XIII ff. We mainly rely on this author for the translation of Yoga texts.

⁶ Cf. M. Eliade, *Yoga*, Paris, 1936, p. 29.

of a philosophical school of Yoga as early as 300 B.C.¹ This original Yoga was probably more different from Sāṃkhya than the classical Yoga which later explained its own original tenets in Sāṃkhya terminology. Prof. Jacobi² has analyzed the ideology of early Yoga and shows that theism was one of the original tenets of this system.

There are two main differences between Sāṃkhya and Yoga, even in later commentaries. Sāṃkhya relies on the teleology of *Prakṛti* to attain the discriminating knowledge necessary for the liberation of the Self (*puruṣa*), whilst Yoga develops an elaborate technique of ascetical practice as a means of salvation. The original Sāṃkhya of the *Kārikās* ignores God and attempts to do without Him; it becomes even more explicitly atheistic later on.³ All spirits or selfs are essentially equal; their differences in this world are the result of their bondage, and disappear in liberation. In Yoga, on the other hand, one Self is essentially different from all others, infinitely perfect and free from all eternity; this is *Īśvara*. In order to see the development of theism in the system and its possible influence on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika authors, we shall consider the three earliest documents one by one.

(a) *The Yoga-Sūtras.*

(1) *Devotion to Īśvara.*

The first book of the *Yoga-Sūtras*, which deals with concentration (*samādhi*), mentions, among various means of attaining that power, devotion to *Īśvara* (*īśvara-praṇidhāna*, I, 23). The third and fourth book, describing the supernatural powers (*vibhūti*) and the isolation of the seer (*kaivalyam*) respectively, do not contain any reference to God. The second book, however, which treats of the external means (*sādhana*) to attain *samādhi*, mentions devotion to *Īśvara* in three different sūtras. The Yoga of action is said to consist of self-castigation, study and devotion to *Īśvara* (II, 1). Among the eight aids to Yoga (*yogāṅga*) five are external or indirect. The second of these consists in the five observances (*niyama*), viz. cleanliness, contentment, self-castigation, study and devotion to *Īśvara* (II, 32). Finally Patañjali tells us that concentration results from devotion to *Īśvara* (II, 45).

In the first book devotion to God is mentioned in the context of Jñāna-Yoga, and in the second book it is classified under Kriyā-Yoga.⁴ The sūtras, however, always use the same word *Īśvarapraṇidhāna*. The commentators rightly interpret it according to the context. In the first book it means, the Bhāṣya explains, a special kind of love or devotion to God (*bhaktivīśeṣa*). It will consist in making *Īśvara* the centre of one's meditation, repeating the sacred syllable and meditating upon it as the verbal expression of God (Bh. I, 28). As a result of this, *Īśvara* gratifies the Yogi, by conferring upon him concentration and its fruit (*tata īśvaraḥ samādhi-tadphala-lābhena tam anugrhnāti*, Vācaspati, I, 28). On the other hand, the *Īśvarapraṇidhāna* of the second book is explained by the Bhāṣya as the offering up to God of all actions, or as the renunciation of the fruit of all these actions (*sarva-kriyānām paramagurau arpaṇam tatphala-sanyāso vā*). Vācaspati quotes here the *Gītā*: 'In work thy rightful interest should be, nor even in its fruits, let not thy motive be the fruit of work; to no work let thine attach-

¹ Cf. S. B. K. Preuss, *AK. der Wiss.*, 1929, XXVI, Ueber das ursprüngliche Yoga-system.

² Cf. S. B. K. Preuss, *AK. der Wiss.*, 1911, XXXV, Zur Fruehgeschichte der ind. Philosophie.

³ Cf. Eliade, *o.c.*, p. 58.

⁴ Cf. S. Dasgupta, *Yoga as Philosophy and Religion*, London, 1934, p. 161.

ment be' (2, 47, transl. by W. Hill). He also analyzes the relation between devotion to God and the other aids to Yoga. 'If, only as a result of devotion to Īśvara, *samprajñāta samādhi* (concentration conscious of objects, which is the lower stage of *samādhi*) can be attained, there is no need of the seven other aids.' To this objection he answers that, these seven help one to acquire both devotion to God and concentration (II, 45). From the above observations it is clear that neither in the Sūtras nor in the first commentaries, is devotion to God judged indispensable. It only simplifies the attainment of concentration and is not considered as of value in itself.

(2) Description of the nature of Īśvara.

Besides the above references to God, the Sūtras contain an analysis of the nature of the highest Self (I, 24-28), which immediately follows the treatment of *Īśvarapranidhāna* in the first book. God is described as a special self, untouched by hindrances,¹ karma, fruition of karma, and the latent deposits or impressions corresponding to the fruition of karma (*kleśa-karma-vipāka-āśayair-aparāmṛtaḥ puruṣa-viśeṣaiśvaraḥ*, I, 24). The characteristic quality of Īśvara is omniscience (I, 25); He is expressed by the mystic syllable (sū. 27), which should be repeated and meditated upon by the Yogi (sū. 28).

The Sūtras do not attribute any cosmic or cosmogonical function to God. Yoga, being primarily a system of ascetical practice, naturally considers first of all the relation between God and man, or rather between God and the Yogi.

(b) The Yoga-Bhāṣya of Vyāsa.

The *Yoga-Bhāṣya*, attributed to Vyāsa, dates probably from the early seventh or late sixth century. Uddyotakara may or may not have known it. We can be certain, however, that he borrowed his doctrine about the authority of the Veda from a Yoga school. As we shall see later, his proof of the unicity of God is the same as that of Vyāsa.

The Sūtras emphasize the negative features of Īśvara; He is first of all a self free from bondage and its consequences. The positive attributes which are mentioned, viz. His eternity, His omniscience and His being the teacher of the primal Sages, are developed by the Bhāṣya (I, 24-28). To these are added: His omniscience, His unicity, His being the merciful Revealer of the Veda; finally the insinuation that He is the Maker of things.

(1) God's eternal omnipotence.

The divine characteristics of sūtra 24 apply equally to those selves who have attained Isolation. Yet God is different since 'He is at all times liberated and at all times the Īśvara'. All selves are eternal, but Īśvara alone is eternally free. This eternal superiority (*utkarṣa*) results from His assuming at all times a *sattva* of perfect quality (*prakṛṣṭa-sattva-upādānāt*). God's connection with matter, far from being a cause of bondage, is the means by which He knows perfectly and acts freely. This eternal assumption of a pure *sattva* constitutes also God's superiority over all the primal Sages, whose teacher He is. They are limited by time, i.e. they are incarnated at and for a definite period of time; God, however, is at all times endowed

¹ These hindrances (*kleśa*) are enumerated elsewhere in the Sūtras (II, 3); they are (*avidyā*), feeling-of-personality (*asmitā*), passion (*rāga*), aversion (*dveṣa*) and will-to-live (*abhiniveśa*).

with a pure *sattva*; during the *pralayas* God's *sattva* too is absorbed in *prakṛti*, but at the beginning of each new creation, God assumes it again.

This superiority of God, in other words this assumption of a pure *sattva*, is proved by the sacred books, which are the eternal expression of His *sattva*. This proof is not yet developed by the Bhāṣya; it implies that only an omniscient God, in whom there is no error (whose *sattva* is pure), could have composed the Scriptures. Vācaspati will be more explicit.

(2) God's unicity.

God's omnipotence has nothing equal or superior to it. If anybody were superior to God, then that one would be the *Īśvara*. If anybody were equal to Him, and both wanted the same thing simultaneously, then two alternatives are possible. Either no one gets the desired object, and then neither can be called *Īśvara*, or one obtains it, and then that one is the real *Īśvara*.

(3) God's omniscience.

Vyāsa restates, in sūtra 25, that it is in God that the limit of knowledge (*kāṣṭhā*) is reached. Any scale of perfections, he says, must needs reach a highest limit; this applies to knowledge, and proves that somebody must be omniscient.¹ To know that this somebody is *Īśvara*, we have to rely on the testimony of Scripture.

(4) God, the merciful Revealer of the Vedas.

We have seen already that God's superiority consists in His assumption of a pure *sattva*, which enables Him to act as Lord and to teach the primal Sages. The Bhāṣya now proceeds further, and explains that the lord assumes *sattva* not for any selfish motive (*ātmānugraha*) but out of mercy for created beings. 'Although He is above all feelings of self-gratification, yet to Him the mercy for the creatures is a (sufficient) motive. He may be conceived as resolving: "By instruction in knowledge and right-living (*dharma*), at the periodical and final dissolutions, I shall lift up all transmigratory spirits." And likewise it has been said ²: "The first knower, Lord and great Sage, assuming a created mind-stuff through compassion, unto Asuri who desired to know, declared this doctrine."' (Y.Bh., I, 24.)

This conception of God's mercy as the motive of revelation is found also in the *Nyāya-Bhāṣya*.

(5) God, the Maker of things.

It is commonly believed that the *Yoga-Bhāṣya* does not attribute any cosmic or cosmogonical function to God. Vyāsa, it is true, does not do so explicitly but when dealing with the Yogic powers he clearly implies God's efficient causality in shaping things as they now are. Having enumerated the eight *siddhis*, he adds: 'Although having power, he (the Yogi) does not cause a reversal of things. Why not? Because at the will of another (viz. *Īśvara*), who determines things according to desire and who from the beginning is perfected the elements have so been willed' (*na ca śakto 'pi*

¹ Omniscience here does not mean illimited knowledge but only the highest of a series of limited perfections.

² By Pancasikha, an early teacher of Sāṃkhya. Cf. H. Jacobi, Ueber das urspr. Yoga System, p. 19.

padārtha-viparyāsaṃ karoti. Kasmāt? Anyasya yu... Kāmāvasāyinaḥ pūrvāsiddhasya tathā bhuteṣu saṃkalpāt, Y.Bh., 3, 45). Vācaspati, who ascribes to God a general cosmic function, as we shall see presently, explains this passage as follows: The Yogi can make poison produce the effect of nectar, thus causing a reversal of powers (*śaktiviparyāsa*). But he does not cause a reversal of things (*padārtha-viparyāsa*) such as to turn the moon into the sun, because those whose desires are fulfilled do not venture to transgress the command of the Exalted Highest *Īśvara* (*na khalu ete yatra kāmāvasāyinaḥ tatra bhavataḥ parameśvarasya ajñām atikramitum utsāhante*). The implication of this is that things are what they are, because they have been willed (and made) thus by *Īśvara*.

(c) *The Tattva-Vaiśārādī of Vācaspati.*

Vācaspati contributes to the theism of Yoga by explaining in what God's omnipotence (*aiśvarya*) exactly consists and by proving its existence from the fact of Scripture. Furthermore he clearly states that God is the maker of the universe and the director of the teleology of *Prakṛti*.

(1) *God's omnipotence.*

God's *aiśvarya* consists in His perfect power to know and to act (*jñāna-kriyā-śaktisampad-aiśvaryaṃ*) and is due to His assumption of a perfect *sattva*, entirely free from *rajas* and *tamas*.

The relation of God to matter (even pure *sattva* is a product of *prakṛti*) is not caused by illusion (*avidyā*) but by the resolve to teach knowledge and right-living to man, in order to liberate him from the cycle of rebirths. The world being without an absolute beginning, God's resolve to help man and His assumption of *sattva* are also without beginning. This is proved by the existence of the sacred books.

The incantations and the medical Vedas are authoritative because they never fail to achieve their object. They could only have been composed by One in whom there is no error, i.e., by One who possesses pure *sattva*, viz. by *Īśvara*. The entire Scripture being composed by one and the same author, it follows that it has been composed and revealed by *Īśvara*. Scripture has therefore its source in the perfect quality of God's *sattva*. The relation between God's superiority and Scripture, however, is not a causal one; it is the correspondence between the thing expressed and the word expressing-a-meaning (*vācya-vācaka-sambandha*). God's superiority has its existence (*varṭate*) in the pure *sattva* of His thinking substance (*buddhi*), and Scripture has also its existence in it because it gives expression to this *sattva* (*tad-vācakatvena*). Scripture is the distinguishing characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) by which this relation is known (Vāc., 1, 24). In his commentary on the next sūtra, Vācaspati describes the characteristics of real Scripture (*āgama*) as *Śruti*, *Smṛti*, *Itihāsa* and *Purāṇa* and as that in which the means of worldly happiness and final bliss are found. Such Scripture gives us information as to God's special qualities, such as His name (e.g., *Śiva* or *Īśvara*). Pseudo-scripture (*āgamābhāsa*) composed by Buddha and others is not Scripture since it teaches soullessness (*naivātmyam*) and momentariness (*kṣaṇikavāda*), both of which are contradicted by all *pramāṇas*.

The above proof presupposes the experimental efficacy of incantations and medical Vedas and postulates a single author for the entire Scripture. There is a marked difference between this proof and the proofs of Nyāya; in the latter a quotation from Scripture is added to confirm the arguments, but here Scripture is made the starting-point, the *lakṣaṇa* by which God's omnipotence is manifested.

(2) *God's cosmic function.*

We have already referred to a passage where Vācaspati implies God's agency in shaping the world [see (b) *The Yoga-Bhāṣya*, (5) *God, the Maker of things*]. When explaining that God is the merciful revealer of the Vedas (I, 25) he asks himself how a compassionate and all-powerful God could possibly create a world so full of sorrow. He answers that although God makes living beings feel pleasure and pain, still He is not uncompassionate, since the mind-stuff has yet its task to fulfil (*acaritārthatvāc-cittasya*). This answer does not do full justice to God's omnipotence, but it certainly implies God's cosmic function. In a third passage, God is said to direct the teleology of *Prakṛti*.

The *Yoga-Bhāṣya* explains the relationship between Karma and *Prakṛti* as follows. Karma, being a product of *Prakṛti*, cannot set its own cause into action and cannot therefore actuate *Prakṛti*. Yet Karma (merit and demerit) is an efficient cause because just as a peasant cuts the enclosure between two fields and does not remove the water which flows by itself, in the same way merit cuts demerit, the obstacle in the way of self-evolving *Prakṛti*. Vācaspati appeals here to God's efficient causality. The purpose of the self cannot be the mover since it is not yet realized (*na ca puruṣārtho 'pi pravartakah*); it is Īśvara who for the sake of establishing *dharma* removes the obstacles; it is due to His activity that merit produces its effects (Vāc., IV, 3).

3. DEVELOPMENT OF THEISM IN VAIŚEṢIKA.

(a) The Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras expose at length the essential concepts of the soul-theory as we find it later in developed Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (esp. V.S., 3, 2, 4 ff.). But nowhere is a highest soul mentioned, nowhere is Īśvara named and no passage directly refers to Him.¹ Later commentators, as for example Saṅkara Miśra in his *Upaskāra* (seventeenth century), see a reference to Īśvara in the third sūtra of the first book: *tad-vacanād-āmnāyasya-prāmāṇyam*.² But the word *tad* of the sūtra refers to *dharma* (duty, meritorious acts) which has been defined in the previous sūtra, and the text should be translated: 'The authoritativeness of Scripture is due to its being an exposition of *dharma*.'

Kaṇāda accepts the authority of the Vedas but does not teach that God has revealed them. From the knowledge required to compose the Vedas, he concludes that beings, superior to men, must have been the authors. They alone could perceive the invisible substances, like air for example, which are named therein (*buddhipurvā vākyakṛtir vede*; *brāhmaṇe saṃjñā-karma siddhiliṅgam*, 6, 1, 1-2; and *saṃjñā-karma tu asmad-viśiṣṭānām liṅgam*; *pratyakṣa pravṛttatvāt saṃjñā-karmaṇaḥ*, 2, 1, 18-19).

(b) Prāśastapāda holds essentially the same doctrine as the Sūtras regarding the authority of the Vedas and the soul-theory (Pr. Bh., p. 360); he does not mention Īśvara in this connection. The authority of the Scriptures depends upon the authority of the speaker (*āmnāyo vaktṛprāmāṇy-āpekṣaḥ*; *tadvacanād-āmnāyā-prāmāṇyam*, p. 576); elsewhere following the example of the sūtras, Prāśastapāda too speaks of the authors of Scripture in the plural and ascribes their superior knowledge to their merit (*āmnāya-vidhātṛṇām ṛṣiṇām*, p. 621). Yet, unlike Kaṇāda, Prāśastapāda

¹ Cf. Faddegon, *The Vaiśeṣika System*, p. 309.

² Prāśastapāda implicitly accepts this interpretation when he says that *dharma* is prescribed by God (Pr. Bh., p. 20).

is undoubtedly a theist. He opens his commentary by paying homage to Īśvara, the cause (of the world). He then goes on to say that the knowledge of the six categories is the cause of liberation; this knowledge itself, however, results from *dharma* which is prescribed by Īśvara (*tac-c-ēśvara codan-ābhivyaktād-dharmādeva*, p. 20).¹ In the last śloka of the book he mentions Maheśvara, whom Kaṇāda is said to have pleased. Besides these secondary references, Praśastapāda teaches that the periodic process of creation and dissolution (*srṣṭi-saṁhāra-vidhī*) is caused by the desire (*sisṛkṣā* and *saṁjīhīṣā*) of Īśvara. In this description of creation, the great Egg (*mahad-aṇḍam*) is said to be brought into existence by the mere thought of the Supreme Lord (*maheśvarasy-ābhidhyāna-mātrāt*, p. 277). Further, when treating of the quality dimension (*parimāṇa*), Praśastapāda explains that largeness (*mahattva*) and length (*dīrghatva*) are produced in the molecules by plurality (*bahutva-saṁkhyā*), just as minuteness (*anutva*) and shortness (*hrasvatva*) in the binary atoms is produced by duality (*dvitva-saṁkhyā*). But this duality and this plurality depend for their existence on the knowledge of Īśvara (*Īśvara-buddhim-apekṣy-otpannā bahusaṁkhyā*, p. 471). This cosmogonical function of God's intellect will be developed by Udayana into an argument to prove the existence of God. Praśastapāda mentions it to explain how atoms without extension are able to produce molecules with extension.

The author of the Bhāṣya accepts therefore the existence of God without attempting to prove it. Theism is not treated as an integral part of his philosophical system. Prof. Keith suggests that early discussions between Kaṇāda and Praśastapāda resulted in the assumption of a creator, to explain the periodic cosmic process.² We cannot be sure of this, and the natural explanation seems to be the religious belief of Praśastapāda, who was a Śaiva.

(c) The next Vaiśeṣika authors made further progress towards philosophical theism. Vyomaśiva and Śrīdhara (we consider Udayana with the authors of Nyāya) devote several pages to the proof of the existence of God and to a description of His nature. They do this, not in connection with the soul-theory, as we should have expected, but when commenting on Praśastapāda's exposition of the process of creation. Śivādītya, however, the first syncretic author who bases his teaching on the Vaiśeṣika system (tenth or eleventh century), mentions Īśvara only once; but he does so when dealing with the substance soul: 'The soul is of two kinds: Supreme and individual. The Supreme Soul is Īśvara and only one.'³ From the above exposition it is clear how theism was only gradually incorporated into Vaiśeṣika, which originally ignored Īśvara altogether.

(4) DEVELOPMENT OF THEISM IN NYĀYA.

Gautama already devotes three short sūtras to the view that God is the cause of the world. These sūtras were the starting-point of the theism

¹ Praśastapāda *implicitly* accepts here the indirect divine authorship of Scripture. *Dharma* is said to be prescribed by Īśvara, and Praśastapāda also agrees with the Sūtras that the Vedas are an exposition of *dharma*. But again, when exposing *dharma ex professo* and giving a list of 16 virtues, he does not make any explicit reference to God or to Scripture (Pr. Bh., p. 737) and treats the problem from the standpoint of natural ethics.

² Cf. Ind. Logic and Atomism, p. 265. B. Faddegon too remarks upon the eclectic tendencies of the passage on creation, which suggests that it did not form part of the original Vaiśeṣika System. Cf. o.c., p. 165.

³ *Saptopadārthi*, T.P.H., Madras, 1930, p. 20.

of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, all subsequent authors of both systems being undoubtedly theists. The theism of Gautama himself, however, is not evident. We shall examine the context and the meaning of the theistic sūtras in the next chapter; at present we intend to show, that whatever may have been the position of Gautama, theism was not an original tenet of Nyāya.

The doctrine of karma as exposed in the *Nyāya-Sūtras* leaves little room for Īśvara and all Naiyāyikas will be faced with the problem of a Supreme Lord and a mechanical and inevitable law of retribution. There are moreover two other considerations which will prove that originally theism was not treated as an essential part of Nyāya but must have been added after Nyāya had developed into a system.

(a) In the systematic exposition of the soul-theory (the soul is the first object of valid knowledge), neither Gautama nor his first commentators (Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati) distinguish between the individual and the Supreme Soul (N.S., 1, 1-26). If theism had originally belonged to the system we would naturally find a reference to God here, as we find it later. Udayana for example, in his short *Lakṣaṇāvalī*, and Bhāsarvajña, the first syncretic author of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, in his *Nyāya-Sāra* (p. 84), mentions Īśvara when exposing the soul-theory.

Vātsyāyana already uses the word *pratyātmā* (individual soul); he also describes God as a special soul and thus incorporates theism into the system, but he does this when commenting on the three theistic sūtras and not when exposing *ex professo* the soul-theory. Besides, the idea seems to be new to him, judging from the way he stresses the fact that God cannot be conceived otherwise. 'God is a distinct soul endowed with certain qualities as a being of the same kind as soul; he cannot be put under any other category' (*guṇa-viśiṣṭam ātmāntaram īśvaraḥ tasy-ātmakalpāt kalpāntar-ānupapattēḥ*); and a few lines further: 'There is no category except the category of the soul to which God could belong' (*na c-ātma-kalpād anyāḥ kalpaḥ sambhavati*).

(b) Nyāya accepts the Vedas and deduces their authority from the trustworthiness of the reliable exposition (*āptaprāmāṇyāt* or as later authors put it *āptoktatvāt*). The Sūtras already bring forward this argument, without specifying who is meant by the 'reliable expositor'. 'The trustworthiness of the word of the Veda is based upon the trustworthiness of the reliable expositor, just as the trustworthiness of the incantations of medical scriptures' (*mantr-āyurveda-prāmāṇyavac-ca tatprāmāṇyam āpta-prāmāṇyāt*, N.S., 2, 1, 69).

Vātsyāyana's rather lengthy commentary on the above sūtra may be summarized as follows. The trustworthiness of incantations and medical scriptures can be established by the fact that they produce the desired results. This trustworthiness is due to the trustworthiness of the reliable expositor who must have as his qualifications: (1) superior knowledge, (2) compassion, (3) the desire to describe things as they are. From the trustworthiness of one part of the Vedas dealing with visible things, we infer that those parts which deal with invisible things are also trustworthy. The *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* uses the plural in drawing the conclusion: 'The seers and speakers are the same reliable persons in the case of the Vedic texts and that of the medical scriptures, so that from the trustworthiness of the latter we can infer that of the former also' (*ye ev-āptā vedārthānām draṣṭārāḥ pravak-tāraś-ca*). Finally dealing with a Mīmāṃsaka objection, Vātsyāyana says that all that can be meant by eternal Vedas is 'continuity of tradition' and 'activity according to them throughout the ages' (*sampradāy-ābhāsa-prayog-āvicchēda*). Throughout the long discussion Īśvara is not even mentioned. If theism had been an original tenet of Nyāya, the authority of Scripture

would no doubt have been referred to God.¹ This idea came in later, but only gradually.

Uddyotakara proves the authority of the Vedas by the fact that they have been asserted by a special self (*puruṣaviśeṣa-abhīhitatvād*). It is clear what is meant by this special self, since the Sanskrit word, chosen by Uddyotakara, is taken from the classical definition of God in the *Yoga-Sūtras*.²

Vācaspati is the first Naiyāyika who tells us *explicitly* that the merciful Maker of the universe has revealed the Vedas for the benefit of living beings, and that they are therefore authoritative. But even he does not use the word *Īśvara* in his exposition. Commenting on the above texts (N.S., 2, 1, 69), Vācaspati enumerates four epithets proper to the Maker of the world, viz. (1) capable of making the body (*tanu-nirmāṇa-samartha*), (2) knowing the nature of all things (*samasta-vastu-tattvañña*), (3) untouched by hindrances, karma, fruition of karma and impressions (*kleśa-karma-vipāk-āśay-āparāmyṣṭa*), (4) most merciful (*parama-kāruṇika*). The third epithet is the definition of the God in the *Yoga-Sūtras*. Vācaspati then goes on to say that this Maker of the world sees that living beings are ignorant of the means for procuring what is wholesome and for removing what is unwholesome and that they are moreover afflicted with many sorrows; how then could He help feeling compassion (*katham na tapyeta*)? Feeling compassion and knowing the remedy, how could He help giving instruction? This instruction of One who is a Father for His creatures (*prajānām pitṛkalpa*) is to be accepted reverently by all. Scripture made by Him is authoritative; it has been revealed by a trustworthy person just as the incantations and the teachings of the medical Veda.

From this it is evident whereon both Uddyotakara and Vācaspati base their views on the authority of the Veda. Where they differ from the sūtras and the Bhāṣya, they use the technical terms of Yoga.

The above considerations suggest very strongly that originally theism was not a tenet of Nyāya. Theism was borrowed from Yoga and was accepted very early (already by Gautama as the next chapter will show), probably because the authors of Nyāya felt the need of giving their religious practices a theoretical expression.

CHAPTER V

THE THEISTIC SŪTRAS OF GAUTAMA

As we have seen in the previous chapter the Vaiśeṣika system was originally not theistic, and it is also nearly certain that theism was not an original tenet of Nyāya. This, however, does not necessarily mean that Gautama himself cannot have been a theist. The analysis of the context of the theistic sūtras that is to follow leads us to conclude that Gautama had his own theistic views on the origin of things. Although we cannot be sure of this, the importance of the theistic sūtras is for that reason in no way diminished. Rightly or wrongly all commentators consider the theistic

¹ Compare M. Hiriyanna: 'It is instructive to note that in all probability the belief neither in God nor in the Veda was originally a part of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika teaching.' Cf. *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, London, 1932, p. 259n.

² Prof. Jacobi must have overlooked this when he said that the *Vārtika* does not teach that God has revealed the Vedas (cf. *Entw.*, p. 47).

sūtras to be the expression of Gautama's theism and make these sūtras the basis of their own exposition of theism. The purpose of these sūtras is not to prove the existence of God, but to solve the conflict between Īśvara and karma. They represent the first attempt to reconcile theism with the Nyāya system. Among the different interpretations which we shall have to examine only two can claim a serious probability of setting forth the author's point of view.

(1) CONTEXT OF THE THEISTIC SŪTRAS (4, 1, 19-21).

The context of the theistic sūtras is as follows: Gautama examines the sixteen categories¹ one after another; the second category is *prameya*, object of valid knowledge. There are twelve *prameyas*, the ninth of them being rebirth (*pretya-bhāva*, lit. the existence of the soul after death). Only one sūtra is devoted to rebirth, the existence of which is proved by the eternity of the soul. Before examining the tenth *prameya*, Gautama deals with metaphysical questions, to which he devotes more than thirty sūtras (N.S., 4, 1, 11-43). A careful analysis of this section² is necessary for a correct understanding of the theistic sūtras. For clearness' sake we have divided this section into five subsections, the first four of them dealing with the problem of the origin of things.

(a) **Sūtras 11-13**: Statement and defense of the view that all perceptible things originate from perceptible things (*vyaktād vyaktānām*). The word *vyakta*, according to the *Nyāya-Bhāṣya*, means discernible through the senses (*indriya-grāhya*); according to the *Vārtika* it stands for anything endowed with perceptible qualities such as colour, etc. (*upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāptam rūpādi-yuktam*). Since Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not admit an exchange of specific qualities, the ultimate material causes, viz. the atoms, are said to be endowed with those qualities also (cf. Chapter III above, and V.S., 2, 1, 24; *kāraṇaguṇapūrvakāḥ kāryaguṇa dṛṣṭāḥ*).

(b) **Sūtras 14-18**: Statement and defense of the theory that things originate from the evanescence of their material cause. The *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* interprets this point differently; we must therefore make a closer examination of this subsection.

Sūtra 14: (*Abhāvād bhāvotpattir nānupamṛdyā prādurbhāvāt*): 'Things are produced out of non-being, since no object comes into existence without having destroyed (its material cause).'

Sūtra 15 objects: (*Vyāghātād aprayogaḥ*): 'This is false, since it involves contradiction.' That which does not exist cannot be active.

Sūtra 16 answers: (*Nātī-ānagatayoḥ kāraṇa-śabda-prayogaḥ*): 'No, sūtra 14 is correct, since past and future entities are used as subject, etc., in sentences.' For example, the jar existed, a son shall be born. Some activity is therefore ascribed to them.

Sūtra 17 objects: (*Na vināṣṭebhyo 'niṣpatteḥ*): 'Even so, the view of sūtra 14 is not correct, since there is no production out of destroyed things.' That which does no more exist cannot produce anything.

Sūtra 18 answers: (*Krama-nirdeśād apratiṣedhaḥ*): 'This is not an objection against sūtra 14, since we maintain (only) the sequence.' It is not taught that a no longer existing cause still produces the effect, but that the effect follows after the destruction of the cause; this is the Nyāya-

¹ These categories of the *Nyāya-Sūtras* have no metaphysical meaning as in *Vaiśeṣika* and have rightly been called topics. They are supposed to represent stages in a debate and are practically only headings of the chapters.

² Cf. W. Ruben, *Die Nyāya-Sūtras*, pp. 99-107.

theory of *Asatkāryavāda*. Sūtra 14 can therefore be understood as a formulation of a specifically Naiyāyika theory.

According to the *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* this subsection states and refutes the thesis of an opponent who holds that things originate from mere non-being (*asatah*).¹

The author then observes: 'We now proceed to expose the views of philosophers of various schools.' (Uddyotakara too speaks in a similar way, but he adds that some views are set forth for criticism and others put up as accepted.) The *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* then interprets sūtras 14 and 16 as the opponent's view, sūtras 15 and 17 as objections made by Gautama and sūtra 18 as the final Nyāya-Siddhānta with the following meaning:—

'We do not deny the sequence of cause and effect; but the fact that the cause must cease to exist in order to produce the effect does not prove that entities are produced out of non-being. One combination of the components of the cause (e.g. the seed) must cease to exist in order that a new one may come into existence and it is out of the new combination that the next substance (the sprout) is produced. Since there is no other cause besides the components of the seed it is only right that the seed should be considered as the cause of the sprout.'

In spite of all his subtleties Vātsyāyana, too, restates the Nyāya-Siddhānta observing that the cause (the seed) must cease to exist before the effect (the sprout) can be produced. There was really no need to make sūtra 14 the thesis of an opponent.²

In any case, even if this interpretation is correct, the final sūtra certainly represents Gautama's teaching about the material cause of things; both Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara were therefore wrong in separating this subsection from the previous one by introducing it as the view of other schools. A possible reason for this may have been the fear of being identified with unorthodox Buddhism which taught a similar doctrine.³ A curious coincidence seems to strengthen this hypothesis; Praśastapāda too only vaguely alludes to the *Asatkāryavāda* of the Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras.⁴

(c) **Sūtras 19–21:** Statement and defense of the view that Īśvara is the cause of the origin of things. The following literal translation of these three sūtras will enable us to follow the discussion concerning the different interpretations.

Sūtra 19: (*Īśvarah kāraṇam puruṣa-karm-āphalya-darśanāt*): 'Īśvara is the cause (of the origin of things) because it is seen that the karma of man remains fruitless.'

Sūtra 20 objects: (*Na, puruṣa-karm-ābhāve phal-āniṣpatteḥ*): 'This is not so, because no fruit appears without the karma of man.'

Sūtra 21 answers: (*Tat-kāritatvād ahetuḥ*): 'The objection is pointless, since it (karma) is actuated by Him (Īśvara).'

¹ Uddyotakara is the first to call this subsection *śūnyāt-opādāna-prakaranam*.

The sūtras do not use the word *śūnya*, but they do contain refutations of Mādhya-mika views in the fifth part of the present section (sūtras 37–40) or elsewhere (4, 2, 25–37). This does not necessarily mean that they were written after Nagarjuna, the great expounder of the *śūnyavāda*, as these refutations may refer to earlier similar doctrines (cf. G. N. Kaviraja in Introduction to Nyāya-Sūtras, P.O. Series, X).

² For a similar instance where the meaning of the sūtra has been completely changed by the N.V., without changing the wording, cf. W. Ruben, o.c., p. 198.

³ Cf. W. Ruben, o.c., p. 101.

⁴ Cf. V.S., 9, 1, 1–10 and B. Faddgeon, o.c., p. 29.

(d) **Sūtras 22-24:** Exposition of the view that the world has been produced without the help of an efficient cause and is therefore the result of chance (*animittato bhāvotpattiḥ*). There are things, as for instance the sharpness of a thorn, which have a material cause but not an efficient cause. The same must be said with regard to the body (sūtra 22). An objection is raised against this statement (sūtra 23) and answered (sūtra 24), but the theory itself is not refuted here. It is evidently not the view of Gautama and is irreconcilable with his doctrine of karma. The *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* adds that the thesis of sūtra 22 does not differ from the view that the origin of the body is not the result of karma, and must be considered as refuted by the refutation of that view (N.S., 3, 2, 60-72).

(e) **Sūtras 25-43:** Enunciation and refutation of five general statements, viz. that all things are (1) evanescent (*sarvam anityam*), (2) eternal (*nityam*), (3) diversity (*prthag*), (4) non-being (*abhāva*), and (5) that all things can be grouped in numbers (e.g. 'all things are two' as *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* in Sāṃkhya).

(2) THE AIM OF GAUTAMA.

The section containing the theistic sūtras begins with an exposition and defense of three theories on the origin of things. These three theories are not refuted here nor elsewhere in the *Nyāya-Sūtras*; on the contrary they are perfectly compatible with one another. Neither is the fourth and last theory concerning the origin of things refuted in this section, though it is in evident contradiction with the previous teaching on karma and also with the theistic sūtras; as Vātsyāyana points out, an explicit refutation may have been thought superfluous here. Anyhow there can be no reasonable doubt that it does not represent Gautama's view. The second half of the section (sūtras 25-43) examines and refutes five statements which are no longer directly concerned with the origin of things.

Nowhere in the whole section does the author leave us in doubt regarding his own point of view. The first half of the section (sūtras 11-24) presents a certain organic unity; Gautama gives first his own theories about the origin of things and then concludes by quoting a theory on which we know his mind. We are therefore justified in assuming that the theistic sūtras express the teaching of Gautama himself. Our opinion is corroborated by the fact that it is shared by all subsequent Naiyāyikas. They do away with the unity of the above context and display a great variety in the interpretation of the sūtras in question, but all of them, being theists themselves, take it for granted that in some way or other Gautama is here giving his own theistic views on the origin of things.¹

In the previous chapter we saw that theism was not an original tenet of Nyāya; this sufficiently explains the fact that Īśvara is mentioned only once in the sūtras. No solid argument, however, can be brought against the hypothesis that theism was already accepted by the author of the

¹ The Rev. K. M. Bānerjee in his *Dialogues on the Hindu Philosophy* (London, 1861) asserts that 'Gotama does introduce the name of God, but only to maintain that He was not the cause of the universe' (p. 144). He rightly holds that Kaṇāda was not a theist; on the strength of this he argues that Gautama, whom he considers prior to Kaṇāda, cannot have been a theist either. Gautama however wrote later than Kaṇāda, and the similarity between V.S., 5, 2, 17 and N.S., 4, 1, 21, if it is to prove anything at all, rather favours the view that Gautama was a theist. Kaṇāda ascribes rebirth to the agency of *adṛṣṭa* (*adṛṣṭakārita*), whilst Gautama, who does not deny the influence of karma, asserts that karma itself is actuated by God (*tat-kāritatva*).

sūtras. On the other hand, we have in the above analysis of the context, an argument in favour of the opinion that Gautama was a theist.¹

If then the theistic sūtras represent the author's own point of view, he implicitly admits the existence of God. May we now proceed a step further and conclude that he is trying to prove the existence of God? Most certainly not. Gautama has here grouped his view on the origin of things; he first states two Nyāya doctrines concerning the material cause of things; perceptible things originate from perceptible things, according to the law of *Asatkāryavāda*, i.e. through the evanescence of their material cause. He then approaches the problem of the efficient cause. Who or what determines the origin of things? He has previously exposed the law of karma, he has stated that karma is the cause (*nimitta*) of the formation of the body, and that it rigidly determines the connection of a given soul with a particular body. Is karma then the ultimate cause? But note that Gautama also believes in the existence of Īśvara. He is therefore faced with the paradox of a Supreme Lord and an immutable law of retribution. The existence of God itself is therefore not the problem which occupies Gautama's mind. He is trying to solve the antinomy of Īśvara and karma, and has given his solution in the three theistic sūtras.²

(3) VARIOUS INTERPRETATIONS.

We now know that the sūtras in question represent Gautama's own theistic views and we are aware of the problem they are meant to solve; yet this does not do away with all uncertainty. While the early commentators are unanimous in maintaining that the last sūtra expresses the Nyāya-Siddhānta of Gautama himself,³ they do not agree on the meaning of the first sūtra. Both Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara introduce this sūtra with the words: 'Another one says'; yet both interpret it as representing the Nyāya view. Vācaspati and Udayana, on the contrary, see in it the doctrine of an opponent. We shall first examine three interpretations which consider sūtra 19 as the thesis of Gautama. The first one seems to tally with the obvious meaning of the text.⁴ The second and the third interpretations are those of Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara respectively. Neither of them truly renders the meaning of Gautama; we shall have occasion to refer to these interpretations later, when treating the problem of Īśvara *versus* karma in the last chapter.

(a) The first interpretation takes the reason given in sūtra 19 (viz. *puṛuṣa-karm-āphalya*) to mean occasional exceptions to the law of karma. If we translate the sūtras according to this interpretation, they will read as follows:—

Sūtra 19: *God (and not karma) is the cause (of the origin of things) since it is seen that the karma of man remains (occasionally) without its fruit.*

¹ Dr. G. N. Jha holds that the sūtrakāra was not a theist. Cf. Proceedings and Transactions of 1st Or. Conf., Poona, pp. 281-5.

² We reach the same conclusion if we accept the interpretation of the N.Bh. for sūtras 14-18. In that case Gautama first gives his own view about the material cause of things and refutes the opponent's thesis that things originate from the mere void; he then examines the problem of efficient causality, stating his own teaching that God and not karma is the prime mover. He concludes by mentioning an opponent's view that the world is the result of chance.

³ The first to disagree is, as far as we know, Viśvanātha (seventeenth century). According to him, sūtra 19 is the siddhānta, sūtra 20 an objection, sūtra 21 is the answer to the objection and means that fruitlessness is caused by the absence of karma.

⁴ Cf. W. Ruben, o.c., p. 102.

Sūtra 20: *This is not true* (karma is the cause of the origin of things and not God) *since no fruit appears when the karma of man fails* (as in liberation).

Sūtra 21: *Since karma is actuated by God* (in the production of its fruit) *the objection is pointless* (against the view that God is the ultimate cause of the origin of things).

Gautama's reasoning would be as follows: 'There are exceptions to the law of karma, some actions remaining without their due reward or punishment; this proves that God is the cause of the origin of things and not karma. Some say that when the individual karma of a man is exhausted, he is no more reborn into the world. So far they are right, but they conclude therefrom that karma is the cause of the universe, and there they are wrong. We grant that karma does exercise its influence in the origin of things, but since the action of karma itself is directed by God, the objection does not prove anything contrary to God's supremacy.'

The above interpretation has a good chance of being the correct one. Unfortunately it involves Gautama in an obvious self-contradiction. In spite of his previous teaching (N.S., 3, 2, 59ff.) he now admits the occasional fruitlessness of karma (sūtra 19), and then goes on to say that it is God who directs karma in the production of its fruit (sūtra 21). If God directs karma, how can it ever be fruitless? Later Naiyāyikas never hold that God can act independently of karma or that the law of karma admits of any exceptions.

(b) Vātsyāyana has seen this difficulty and gives the sūtras a different interpretation. The 'karma of man' which evidently means the action, the deed in as far as it is accomplished and liable to reward or punishment, has been explained by him as the activity of man striving after a certain object (*saṁīhamāna*, *phalāya yatamāna*, *puruṣakāram* instead of *puruṣa-karma*). His very short commentary comes to this:

Sūtra 19: Man striving after a certain end does not necessarily attain his object (*saṁīhamāno nāvaśyam saṁīhā-phalam prāpnoti*). The attainment of this object depends therefore on somebody else, viz. on God. God is consequently the cause (of the origin of things).

Sūtra 20: If the appearance of the result were dependent on God (alone), this result would appear without the effort of man (*puruṣasya saṁīhām antareṇa phalam niṣpadyeta*).

Sūtra 21: God sustains (literally 'takes up') the effort of man; when man is striving after a certain end, God accomplishes it for him (*puruṣa-kāram Īśvaro 'nugrhnāti*. *Phalāya puruṣasya yatamānasyeśvaraḥ phalam sampaḍdayati*). But when God does not accomplish it, then man's action remains fruitless. Since results are thus influenced and caused by God (*Īśvara-karitatvāt*) the objection (of sūtra 20) does not prevent God from being the cause.

This interpretation certainly does away with Gautama's self-contradiction but can hardly be in agreement with his teaching. It takes the theistic sūtras out of their context and implies that Gautama did not even allude to the law of karma when exposing the various causes of the origin of things. Moreover, the fact that man does not always achieve the object of his desires and efforts may be attributed to several other causes, and therefore one can hardly conclude that no one but God grants or withholds the object.

Vātsyāyana, moreover, does not seem to be too sure about his interpretation. He adds a small section in which he describes the nature and attributes of God, and then analyzes the relation between Īśvara and

karma. God, he says, controls the karma of each individual soul, according to the law of karma. He then reverts to the text of Gautama and explains the objection of sūtra 20 on the supposition that the conflict between Īśvara and karma is the subject of the discussion. 'As to what has been urged against the view that God is the cause, viz. that in that case there would be no retribution for the deeds done by men (*svakṛtābhīyāgama-lopa*) we may say that this objection holds good only when the individual karma of man is not operative in the production of the body' (*akarme nimitte śarīra-sarge*).

(c) Uddyotakara offers a slightly different solution which takes into account the interpretation of Bhāṣya, and at the same time explains the sūtras in the light of their main object, viz. the conflict between karma and Īśvara. He understands sūtra 19 to be directed against those who hold that man can control his own karma. The next commentator, Vācaspati, too, points out that besides stating the Vedānta view, sūtra 19 is also directed against those opponents who teach that there is no need of Īśvara, since the intelligent individual souls are capable of producing the world by their own karma. We reproduce Uddyotakara's commentary as shortly as possible, without however leaving out any essential feature.

Sūtra 19: If man by himself (*nirapekṣa*) were capable of procuring the fruit of his deeds, nobody would bring suffering on himself and all would achieve the object of their efforts. But this is exactly what does not happen; God is therefore the cause and not man.

Sūtra 20: If God were the cause, then (1) man would experience happiness and sorrow even in the absence of his individual karma and salvation would be impossible; (2) since God is of a uniform nature (*ekarūpatvāt*), He would treat all in like manner. This is not the case; God does therefore create according to the individual karma of each man. But if God produces the world dependently on karma, then He is not the Lord with regard to karma (*evaṃ karma-sāpekṣaś- ced-īśvaro jagad-utpatti-kāraṇam syāt, karman-īśvaro n-eśvaraḥ syāt*).

Sūtra 21: The above objection holds good only if God were the cause independently of karma (*karm-ānapekṣa*) but this is not what we say; on the contrary we say that God supports the karma of man (*puruṣa-karma īśvaro 'nugṛhṇāti* ¹), which means that He apportions the proper fruit when the time of fruition has come. God does therefore take karma into account; the objection (of sūtra 20) proves nothing.

It looks very much as if Uddyotakara also had adopted his interpretation because he wanted to do away with any self-contradiction in Gautama. That is why sūtra 19 is supposed to be directed against those who hold that man is capable by himself of controlling his karma. This is more or less the interpretation of Vātsyāyana. In sūtra 20, Uddyotakara brings up an objection which Gautama had not thought of, and which is not refuted by the answer of sūtra 21. His interpretation of this sūtra does not explain how God can remain the Lord of karma, if He only actuates karma in conformity with its strict law of retribution. We may safely assert that all this was not in Gautama's mind. The first sūtra certainly implies occasional exceptions to the law of karma and the only way to save Gautama from self-contradiction was to make that sūtra the thesis of an opponent.

(d) According to Vācaspati and Udayana, sūtra 19 enunciates the Vedānta view that God is the constituent or material cause of the world,

¹ Notice how in this sentence Uddyotakara has changed the *puruṣakāram* of N.Bh. into *puruṣakarma*.

sūtra 20 puts forward an objection and sūtra 21 represents the thesis of Nyāya, that God is the operative or efficient cause. This is evidently not the meaning intended by Gautama. If the opposition between Nyāya and Vedānta had been the object of discussion, he would surely have chosen terms to distinguish the material from the efficient cause (*upādāna* and *nimitta*).

(e) At the end of their commentary both Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara add, as we have seen, that the objection of sūtra 20 holds good only against those who teach that God is independent of karma. In his *Kusumāñjali* (I, 3), Udayana characterizes the Supreme Being worshipped by the followers of Mahāpaśupati as the Independent One (*Svatantra*); furthermore we know from the *Sarvadarśana-Saṃgraha* that Lakulīśa (belonging to a *Pāśupata* school) taught that God creates the world without taking the karma of man into account (*anapekṣa*). This view existed, in some form or other, already in Gautama's time and it may be refuted here. If we take up this suggestion and make sūtra 19 the thesis of the opponents,¹ we reach the following interpretation and translation of the theistic sūtras:—

Sūtra 19: (Some say that) *God is the cause* (of the origin of things to the exclusion of karma) *since it is seen that the karma of man* (occasionally) *remains without its fruit.*

Sūtra 20: *This is not true* (God does not cause independently of the karma of man) *since no fruit appears when the karma of man fails.*

Sūtra 21: *Since karma* (however) *is actuated by God* (in the production of its fruit) *this objection is pointless* (against our view that God is the cause, but not independently of karma).

According to this interpretation Gautama himself does not admit any exceptions to the law of karma. Karma does exercise its causality in the origin of things, but it is actuated by God when doing so. God is therefore the ultimate cause of the world.

Conclusion.

Among the above interpretations, only the first and the last are probable explanations of Gautama's own view. These two interpretations do not differ so very much. Both admit a real influence and efficiency of karma, and both state that karma is actuated by God. The first is the more obvious, the last the more consistent interpretation. Briefly the first interpretation reads:

Sūtra 19 (Gautama): God is the cause, since there are occasional exceptions to the law of karma.

Sūtra 20 (opponent): God is not the cause since, without karma, there is no fruit.

Sūtra 21 (Gautama): Since karma is actuated by God, the objection is pointless against God being the cause.

To do away with the contradiction it involves, we have only to add one word in each sūtra, and we reach the last interpretation.

Sūtra 19 (opponent): God is the *independent* cause, since there are occasional exceptions to the law of karma.

Sūtra 20 (Gautama): God is not the *independent* cause since, without karma, there is no fruit.

¹ It certainly does seem very strange that Uddyotakara has not interpreted the 'fruitlessness of the karma of man' (*puruṣa-karm-āphalya*) mentioned in sūtra 19, as the thesis of an opponent. A few pages further in his *Īśvara-prakriyā*, he states as an axiom 'the fruitfulness of men's individual karma' (*dharmādharmasāphalyam*).

Sūtra 21 (Gautama): Since karma is actuated by God, the objection is pointless against God being the *dependent* cause (*sāpekṣa*).

It is difficult to decide which of these two interpretations is the correct one. Both are almost equally probable. If a choice has to be made, the first may be preferred, since it does not require any distinctions. It does involve Gautama in self-contradiction, but we must not forget that theism was new to the system; all its implications could not be solved at the very beginning. The last interpretation represents the solution of the problem *Īśvara versus karma*, reached by the later Naiyāyikas. It is neither impossible nor improbable that Gautama had already found it; but we cannot be sure of this.

CHAPTER VI

ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

(1) GAUTAMA, VĀTSYĀYANA AND PRAŚASTAPĀDA.

From the theistic sūtras of Gautama we might draw up the following argument for the existence of God: 'Karma does not provide us with a complete explanation of the origin of things since it is occasionally fruitless, i.e. man does not always receive due reward or punishment for his actions. This fact postulates the existence of God as the ultimate cause of things. It is true that without karma there is no fruit, i.e. if a man's individual karma is exhausted he is not reborn: but this does not prevent God from being the ultimate cause. We admit the partial causality of karma, but we hold that even in this case karma is actuated by God. God must therefore exist.'

It is clear, however, from what has been said in the previous chapter, that it was not the intention of Gautama to prove the existence of God. As we have already seen, the argument set forth in the previous paragraph would imply a serious self-contradiction. It is perhaps to avoid this difficulty that Vātsyāyana has given the sūtras another meaning. From his commentary we might draw up a different argument for the existence of God: 'Since man does not always achieve the object of his desires and efforts, the attainment of this does not depend on him but on God. God must therefore exist.' This would be a very poor argument indeed. Vātsyāyana, however, did not intend to prove the existence of God. This appears clearly from his description of the nature and attributes of God, which follows his short commentary on the theistic sūtras. Vātsyāyana explicitly states that, barring knowledge (*buddhi*), no attribute of God can be pointed out as a possible proof of His existence. If God, he continues, were not discernible by the presence of knowledge and similar characteristics of the soul, how could His existence be proved by any one; for He is not the object of sense-perception, inference or scriptural argument. This is all that Vātsyāyana has to say about the proof of the existence of God; sense-perception, scriptural texts cannot provide an argument; the only valid argument must be sought in knowledge and the other characteristics of the soul. But Vātsyāyana does not develop this further.

Taking the hint he has given us, we might complete his interpretation of the sūtras as follows: 'Man is not always capable of attaining the object of his desires; this does not therefore depend on him but on somebody else, who possesses the knowledge required to guide man's destiny; that somebody else can only be an omniscient God.'

The insistence on the knowledge of God is a great step forward towards the later classical proofs of God's existence; in these proofs much stress is laid on divine knowledge.

The next, and last, author of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika who takes the existence of God for granted is Praśastapāda. After him the authors of both systems give formal proofs for the existence of God. The origin of these proofs is to be found in the theistic sūtras and in Praśastapāda's exposition of the periodical cosmic process. Gautama, Vātsyāyana and Praśastapāda affirm what the subsequent authors will prove, viz. that God is the cause of the world.

Praśastapāda explicitly refers the creation of the world to the will and intellect of Īśvara. His theory of the 'relating power' of God's intellect constitutes the last of Udayana's eight proofs for the existence of God. Praśastapāda does not use this theory to prove the existence of Īśvara; he simply states the fact that it is by the 'relating power' of God's intellect that duality and plurality is produced in the binary atoms and the molecules: this plurality being in turn responsible for the extension of the molecules.

(2) UDDYOTAKARA.

The author of the *Nyāya-Vārtika* was the first Naiyāyika who made it his definite aim to prove the existence of God. After his commentary on the theistic sūtras, discussed in the previous chapter, he enunciates the Nyāya-Siddhānta as follows: 'God is the efficient or operative cause (*nimitta kāraṇa*) of the world, whilst the earth and other substances in their minutest form, called atoms, are the material cause' (*upādāna kāraṇa*).

Uddyotakara then proceeds in a long section called *Īśvara prakriyā* to prove that God is the efficient cause of the world. He first answers the objection that God's existence itself cannot be proved, by asserting that the very argument that proves God's causality also proves His existence since a cause must exist in order to act as cause (p. 457).

It is therefore clearly his intention to give a formal proof of the existence of God. In the course of the discussion Uddyotakara gives three different classical syllogisms (*nyāya*) to prove the efficient causality of Īśvara.

(a) The first syllogism is formulated against opponents who maintain either primordial matter, or the atoms, or karma to be the efficient cause of the world. The author's answer is that these are unconscious and unintelligent and can act only when directed by an intelligent cause.

- (1) *Proposition (pratijñā)*: Primordial matter, atoms and karma act (only) after having been directed by an intelligent cause, who precedes their activity (*pradhāna-paramāṇu-karmāṇi prāk pravṛtter buddhimat kāraṇ-ādhiṣṭhītāni pravartante*).
- (2) *Reason (hetu)*: Because they are unconscious (*acetanatvāt*).
- (3) *Example (udāharaṇa)*: As the axe, etc. (*vāśyādivat*).
- (4) *Application (upanaya)*: Just as an axe, not being intelligent itself, acts (only) after having been directed by an intelligent carpenter, in the same manner do unconscious *pradhāna*, atoms and karma act (*yathā vāśyādi buddhimatā takṣṇ-ādhiṣṭhitam acetanatvāt pravartante, tathā pradhāna-paramāṇu-karmāṇi acetanāni pravartante*).
- (5) *Conclusion (nigamana)*: Therefore they also are directed by an intelligent cause (*tasmāt tāny-api buddhimat-kāraṇ-ādhiṣṭhāni*).

(b) The second proof is based on the fact that merit and demerit (i.e. karma) are instruments and must therefore be directed by an intelligent cause (p. 459).

- (1) Merit and demerit cause happiness and sorrow to man, under the direction of an intelligent cause (*dharmādharmau buddhimat-kāraṇ-ādhiṣṭhitau puruṣasy-opabhogam kurutaḥ*).
- (2) Because they are instruments (*karaṇatvāt*).
- (3) As the axe, etc. (*vāśyādivat*).

(c) At the end of the discussion, the opponent admits the necessity of God's efficient causality for the beginning of a particular creation (*sargādaṃ*) but does not see how God is an efficient cause at the present time. To this Uddyotakara answers that the preceding argument (b) proves the efficient causality of God even at the present time, since the merit and demerit of the dead are now directed by an intelligent cause. He then adds a third syllogism in which a new consideration is introduced.

- (1) The great elemental substances (earth, water, fire, wind) perform their respective functions (of upholding, wetting, burning and blowing) under the direction of an intelligent cause (*buddhimat-kāraṇ-ādhiṣṭhitāni svāsu-svāsu dhāraṇādi-kriyāsu mahābhūtāni vāyū-antāni pravartante*).
- (2) Because they are unconscious (*acetanatvāt*).
- (3) As the axe, etc. (*vāśyādivat*).

Professor Jacobi remarks that Vācaspati is the first Naiyāyika to leave the anthropomorphic stand-point; he must have overlooked the passage, quoted above, in which Uddyotakara clearly argues from a cosmic point of view. The three syllogisms of Uddyotakara are strikingly similar; they all base their argument on the fact that an unconscious and unintelligent cause is an instrument which must necessarily be directed by an intelligent agent; or as Uddyotakara puts it in the course of the discussion: 'No unconscious thing has ever by itself been found to be the controller of anything.' He himself is aware of this and concludes the discussion by saying that 'with regard to any object brought up in the discussion, we may say that when it is made the subject (of a syllogism), the same conclusion can be reached by means of the same syllogism and the same illustration of the axe' (*evam yatra yatra vipratipattiḥ¹ tat-tad-anena nyāyena anena dṛṣṭāntena vāśyādīnā pakṣayitvā sādhayitavyam*, p. 467).

The chapter ends with a proof from scripture. A passage from the *Mahābhārata* and one from Manu, are quoted, where God is said to be the cause of man's fate and of the world. 'Man is ignorant and not master of his own happiness and sorrow; he goes to heaven or to hell as directed (*prerita*) by God' (*Mahābhārata*, III, 30, 28). 'When that Lord is awake then alone is the world active; and when, with His mind composed, He goes to sleep, the entire world disappears' (Manu, I, 52).

Besides the above proofs, Uddyotakara refutes, at great length, three other views on the origin of the world, and considers three objections against the efficient causality of Īśvara. We reproduce these refutations and objections as briefly as possible; the objections throw much light on Uddyotakara's conception of God's nature.

Three refutations:

(1) Primordial matter (*pradhāna*) directed by the 'aim of the puruṣa' (*puruṣārtha*) cannot be the cause of the world. This *puruṣārtha* is either sense-perception or discernment (between the *guṇas* and the *puruṣa*): in

¹ The text adds *kāryatvam*. This must be an interpolation, as Prof. Jacobi points out. The concept of *kāryatvam* has not been mentioned before throughout the long discussion.

both cases it does not exist before the *pradhāna* has been active and cannot therefore be the cause of its activity. If it be objected that the *puruṣārtha* always exists (according to the *satkāryavāda*) then we may ask (a) why should *pradhāna* act to attain something it already possesses? (b) why should *pradhāna* not be active always, since the cause of its activity is ever-present? The presence of an obstacle cannot be the answer; according to the *satkāryavāda* of the opponent, the obstacle would always be present, in which case activity would be altogether impossible.

(2) The Atoms cannot be the efficient cause of the world, because if they are active by themselves, they ought to be active always. They are not active under the influence of the time of fruition (*kālaviśeṣa*) or karma, because the atoms, time and karma are all unconscious. The objection that the unconscious milk is active in feeding the child is begging the question, since you have to prove that the milk is active by itself. If that really were the case it would be active in dead mothers also.

(3) The Soul cannot be the controller of its own merit and demerit because it is not conscious as long as it is not endowed with a body and sense-organs. Besides, if the soul could control its own destiny, nobody would bring suffering on himself. In his interpretation of the theistic sūtras (cf. Ch. V) Uddyotakara adds that in the above case man would always attain the object of his desires, a supposition which is contradicted by facts.

Three objections :

(1) 'Agents such as potters, etc., are endowed with action (*kriyāviṣṭa*); God is devoid of action and can therefore not be an agent.' As Vācaspati remarks, this objection supposes that action entails movement which implies a material body. The answer, according to Vācaspati, is that knowing, wishing and willing (actions expressed by verbs) do not imply movement. Uddyotakara's answer, however, is more involved: Action is twofold: (a) the action of 'throwing upwards, etc.', i.e. the five different kinds of physical movement (enumerated in V.S., 1, 1, 7), (b) the action which is expressed by means of verbs (*ākhyāta-śabdavācya*). The action expressed by verbs surely belongs to God, and the objection 'God is devoid of action' does not hold good in this case. If the first kind of action is considered, then we also agree that such action is not found in God: but even in that case the reason given by the opponent is too general (*anaikāntika*). He maintains that agents are endowed with action, but this is not universally true, since there are both moving and unmoving causes (*kriyāvaca-kāraṇam dr̥ṣṭam niṣkriyam ca*): substances which have stopped moving, do sometimes produce a new object.

(2) 'God cannot be the creator of the world. He creates either independently of anything (*anapekṣa*) or He depends on other things for His creation (*sāpekṣa*). If God creates certain things independently of everything, it ought to be possible for Him to create all things in the same way; in that case the karma of man would be futile, liberation would be impossible¹ and there would be no retribution for the deeds done by man. On the other hand, if God depends on something else for his creation (viz. karma), He is not the maker of that with the help of which 'He creates' (p. 461).

¹ If God were an independent creator, liberation would no longer be due to the exhaustion of karma; but it would not therefore become impossible, since God could freely bestow it. Uddyotakara does not stop to consider this point because he rejects the first alternative of the objection altogether.

Uddyotakara does not hold autonomous creation (*nirapekṣa-kartr̥tvam*) and is very anxious to do away with the first tenet that God creates independently of all things. 'We have never held the view that God creates independently of all things outside Himself.' The reason brought up in connection with the second alternative, i.e. God's dependent creation, is not universally true, explains Uddyotakara. A man skilled in many arts may make his own instruments first and therefore be the maker of the things with the help of which he makes other things. In the same way God creates the body with the help of karma, but He has also brought that karma into existence with the help of a previous body, its pleasures and pains; that previous body was also made by God with the help of a previous karma, and so on. God is therefore the maker of the instruments He uses. It is useless to object that the first creation should have been brought about without the help of any instrument, because a first creation has never taken place (*anādiḥ saṃsārah*). It is only in the hypothesis of a beginningless creation and a dependent creator, the *Vārtika* concludes, that merit and demerit can be effective (*dharmādharmānām sāphalyam*).

(3) 'God cannot be the efficient cause of the world because all agents act with a certain motive, either to acquire or to remove something. God, however, has nothing to get rid off since He knows no suffering, nor has He anything to acquire since He possesses everything (*vaśītvāt*).'

Some people answer, says Uddyotakara, that God creates to amuse Himself (*krīḍārtham*): this is wrong, since He is not in need of amusement. Others think that God creates to manifest His powers (*vibhūti*), but this too is wrong: God acquires nothing by the manifestation of His powers nor does He lose anything by abstaining from that manifestation. We hold that God creates because activity belongs to His very nature (*pravṛtti-svābhāvikam tat tattvam*), just as the earth upholds things because this belongs to its nature.

To the objection that, in this case, God ought always to create and never to be inactive, Uddyotakara answers that God is endowed with intelligence and is not independent. God depends for His activity on (1) the time of fruition of merit and demerit (*dharmādharmayoḥ paripākakāla*), (2) the appearance of auxiliary causes (*kāraṇ-āntar-otpādam*), (3) the presence of beings related to what is to be created (*tad-bhāginām ca sattvānām tatra saṃnidhānam*), (4) the fruition of the merit and demerit of those related beings, (5) the removal of obstacles that prevent the fulfilment of the above conditions.

It must be admitted that Uddyotakara's conception of the dependence of Īśvara on karma is very rigid and that it makes God the mechanical executor of an inexorable law, without the slightest opportunity for spontaneity.

(3) VĀCASPATI MIŚRA.

At the end of his commentary on the theistic sūtras, referred to in the previous chapter, Vācaspati restates the Nyāya-Siddhānta on the origin of things: The atoms are the material cause (*upādāna*) of the world; God, conditioned by the karma of men, is the efficient cause (*puruṣa-karm-āpekṣa īśvaro nimittakāraṇam*); and karma, by which God is conditioned, has also God as its efficient cause (*yacca-ten-āpekṣaṇīyam puruṣa-karma tad-ap-īśvara-nimittakam-eva*). We shall analyze later his solution of the problem of Īśvara versus karma, and consider here only his proof of the existence of God.¹

¹ For a German translation of Vācaspati's exposition cf. H. Jacobi Entw., p. 92ff.

The things of this world (*bhāva*) may be divided into three categories: those that certainly have an intelligent maker, such as palaces, triumphal arches, etc.; those that certainly have none, such as atoms, ether, etc.; and finally those of which it is doubtful whether they have an intelligent maker such as bodies, mountains, etc. To prove that the last category has an intelligent maker, Vācaspati gives the following syllogism:—

- (1) The objects in question, bodies, trees, mountains, etc., have a maker who knows their material well. (They are *upādān-ābhijñā-kartṛkāḥ*.)
- (2) Because they have originated or because their material is unintelligent (*utpattimattvāt, acetan-opādānatvād-vā*).
- (3) That which originates or that of which the material is unintelligent presupposes a maker who knows the material well as in the case of palaces, etc.
- (4) Thus are the objects in question: bodies, trees, mountains, etc.
- (5) Therefore, they are thus (produced by an intelligent maker knowing the material well).

The above syllogism gives two reasons for the existence of an intelligent maker: (a) the material of the objects in question is unconscious: this is Uddyotakara's argument, to which no further reference is made by Vācaspati; (b) the objects in question have originated; from the subsequent discussion it is clear that the author considers 'having originated' (*utpattimattvam*) and 'being an effect' (*kāryatvam*) as synonymous. This argument from *kāryatvam* became the classical proof, which all subsequent Naiyāyikas borrowed from Vācaspati.

Vācaspati proves that the objects in question are effects in as much as they are made up of parts (*sāvayavatvena*) or, having finite magnitude, are subject to movement (*mahattve sati kriyāvattvena*). He, then, proceeds to answer three objections, which we reproduce below. In his answer to the first objection, Vācaspati goes on to prove that the Maker of the world can only be an eternal omniscient God. The answer to the two other objections contains a very interesting discussion on the invariable concomitance of 'being an effect' and 'having an intelligent maker'. In conclusion the author states that other arguments, besides that of things 'having originated', may be brought forward to prove God's existence; unhappily he does not mention any such argument. Finally he quotes texts from Scripture to corroborate (1) God's existence, (2) the eternity of His knowledge, because it is uncaused (*akāraṇatvena c-eśvara-jñāna-nityatā*), (3) the 'bodilessness' of God (*aśarīratvam*).

Three objections :

(1) 'That a product presupposes a maker who knows its material well does not prove that the maker of the world must have an *eternal and all-embracing* knowledge (*nitya-sarva-viśaya-jñāna*); neither are these qualities the endowment of the intelligent maker (i.e. the maker of palaces, etc.), mentioned by way of illustration in Vācaspati's syllogism. In technical language, the *drṣṭānta* is *sādhya-hīna*' (p. 600).

Answer : From colour-perception we infer the existence of an instrument, viz. the eye, because colour-perception is an activity just as the cutting of wood. In the illustration of wood-cutting, the instrument is not the eye but an axe; we need, however, an instrument capable of producing the result of seeing, and since an axe is not the fit instrument, we rightly infer the existence of another instrument, viz. the eye. In a similar way, the

world, being an effect, postulates a maker capable of producing this effect. In this case, the great variety of effects, produced simultaneously, postulates an all-knowing agent, whose knowledge is eternal, i.e. unproduced.

If God's knowledge were produced, by His body for instance, then this body would postulate an intelligent maker: the latter's knowledge, if not eternal, would postulate another maker, and so on. 'Instead of supposing several supra-sensible entities', Vācaspati concludes, 'it is better to suppose only one, viz. the eternity of God's knowledge.' He gives the same reason as a proof for the unicity of God: 'Instead of supposing many beings capable of seeing supra-sensible objects (*atīndriy-ārtha-darsīnaḥ*), it is better to suppose only one; because of the simplicity of the assumption (*kalpanā-lāghava*)' (p. 601).

(2) 'Knowledge is a necessary attribute of God, in as much as He is the cause of the world; knowledge, however, originates from the contact of soul and mind (*manas*) and presupposes a body. God has no body and therefore cannot be the cause of the world.'

Answer: Because we find knowledge connected with a body in many cases, it does not follow that this is always so. Invariable concomitance can only be affirmed in the case of an essential and unconditional connection. The concomitance of knowledge and body depends on the fact of knowledge being produced by the contact of mind and soul; in the case this condition is absent.

(3) 'Products such as bodies, etc., originate, without the intervention of an intelligent maker, from the conjunction of atoms with souls whose karma is ripe.'

Vācaspati—'It is an established fact that there is a natural and absolute connection between having originated and having a maker who knows his material well' (*utpattimattvasy-opādān-ādy-abhijñā-karṭṛkatven-opādhi-virahināḥ svābhāvika-pratibandha-siddhiḥ*, p. 601).

Opponent—This concomitance is conditioned and exists only in the case of products, whose sight is accompanied by the cognition that they have been made by somebody. Now, this is the case only for the objects such as for instance jugs, etc., whose existence one knows to depend on an intelligent agent. But it is a different matter for products in general such as bodies, mountains, etc., the dependence of whose existence on an intelligent being is doubtful.'

Vāc.—'Does being a product consist in the fact that the existence of a given object depends on an intelligent agent (to which we agree), or does it consist in the fact that one perceives the agent? If you hold the latter view, then one who has not seen the act (of causation) cannot possibly know that an object has been made.'

Opp.—'If I see that a certain object depends on an intelligent agent for its existence, then I can apply the same dependence to a similar object (*tad-jātiya*) whose making I have not seen.'

Vāc.—'If all jars have an intelligent maker owing to their being products, then we cannot deny that similar things (bodies) may also have an intelligent maker.'

Opp.—'That which has originated and belongs to the genus "jar", postulates an intelligent maker' (*ghaṭajātiyam-utpattimad-buddhimat-pūrvakam*).

Vāc.—'Palaces are not included in the above clause. Are they therefore without an intelligent maker?'

Opp.—'When an object of a certain genus is known to depend for its existence on an intelligent maker, then all that belongs to that genus has also an intelligent maker, even if we did not observe the fact.'

Vāc.—‘Palaces belong to that genus “product” and have an intelligent maker, therefore bodies, mountains, etc., belonging to the same genus (*kārya-jātiyam*), also have an intelligent maker.’

Opp.—‘The invariable concomitance with an intelligent maker applies only to those products, the material of which is perceptible (to us). This is not the case with bodies (they are made of invisible atoms).’

Vāc.—‘It is only after proving the invariable concomitance between “being a product” and “having an intelligent maker” by positive and negative examples, that you narrow down your conclusion and make it applicable only in the case of a maker with limited intelligence, by adding the condition that the material must be perceptible to us. But we first prove the existence of an intelligent maker in general by the fact of concomitance and it is only afterwards that we conclude to the eternal knowledge of the maker (since the maker must be capable of producing the effect). Therefore, since no valid condition can be brought forward to limit the law of concomitance, we must say that “having originated” is connected with “intelligent causation” from the very nature of things’ (*svabhāva-pratibaddham-utpattimattvaṃ buddhimaddhetukatvena*, p. 603).

(4) SUBSEQUENT AUTHORS.

The subsequent authors of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika who preceded the modern school of Nyāya (*Navya Nyāya*) deserve a careful study; but we shall leave this study to a later publication. We cannot, however, conclude this chapter without making a short reference to their works. In the tenth century, commentaries on the *Praśastapāda-Bhāṣya* were written by Vyomaśiva, Śrīdhara and Udayana, the last of whom will be considered in the next section. The former two authors expose their theistic views when commenting on the periodical process of creation; both prove the existence of God from two sources: scripture and inference. They borrow their proof through inference from Vācaspati: the world is an effect and postulates a maker capable of producing the effect.

VYOMASĪVA classifies the causes involved in the production of the world as follows: the efficient cause (*nimitta kāraṇa*) is the will of Maheśvara; the non-inherent cause (*asamavāyi kāraṇam*) is the conjunction of the souls and the atoms; the constituent or inherent cause (*samavāyi kāraṇam*) is the atoms.

ŚRĪDHARA’s answer to the objection that God, being a maker must be endowed with a body, is worthy of note: ‘The nature of an agent does not consist in possessing a body (otherwise a man would be an agent when sleeping), but in being an operator of instruments capable of producing the effect. This characteristic can belong to a bodiless being, the immaterial soul, e.g., which moves the body.’

BHĀSARVAJÑA, the author of the *Nyāya-Sāra* (tenth century) in his very short proof of God’s existence refers to the contingency of the world. ‘The object in question has an intelligent cause, because once upon a time it did not exist (it exists now), and will return to non-existence, just as clothes, etc.’ (*vivād-ādhyāsitaṃ upalabdhi-mat-kāraṇakam abhūt-vābhāvitvād vastrādi-vat*, p. 84).

JAYANTA BHATṬA’s *Nyāya-Mañjari* (probably tenth century) deals especially with adversaries when exposing the theistic views of the school (pp. 175-188) and devotes many pages to the problem of the authority of the Vedas (pp. 213-270). The most striking peculiarity of Jayanta’s teaching is that among the nine specific qualities of the soul, he attributes

five to God, viz. knowledge, pleasure, desire, volition and merit. This is a departure from the teaching of Uddyotakara and Vācaspati, who accept only three specific qualities and do not admit pleasure and merit in God, as we shall see in the next chapter.

In the twelfth century, GANGEŚA, the founder of the modern school of Nyāya, wrote his *Tattva-Cintāmaṇi*. This book is divided into four parts according to the four *pramāṇas*. At the end of the *Anumāna-Khaṇḍa*, the inference of the existence of God (*Īśvarānumāna*) is treated at length.

Gangeśa borrows his proof from Vācaspati: the world is an effect and therefore it postulates a maker capable of perceiving the supra-sensible atoms, of which it is made. This maker cannot be man; he must therefore be God. Professor Jacobi remarks that the subject is treated according to the masterful dialectic method proper to Gangeśa, but that no new points of view have been introduced (cf. Entw., p. 63).

(5) UDAYANA ĀCĀRYA.

Udayana made theism one of the chief doctrines of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. A correct appreciation of his achievement would require a careful study of all his writings; for the present we need only indicate briefly the contents of the *Kusumāñjali*, a work entirely devoted to the proofs of the existence of God. This book contains 72 *kārikās* (memorial verses), divided into five chapters and accompanied by the author's own commentary. After two introductory *kārikās*, Udayana states that the universal practical belief in a Supreme Being is a sufficient proof of His existence:

'Now with regard to that Being whom all alike worship no matter what end they strive to attain (that Supreme Being is worshipped by)—the followers of the Upaniṣads as the One by nature pure and enlightened; the disciples of Kapila as the perfect First-Knower; the disciples of Patañjali as the One untouched by hindrance, karma, fruition and impressions of karma, who by assuming a created body revealed the Vedas and who is the giver of grace; the followers of Mahāpaśupati as the Independent One, undefiled by actions opposed to the Veda or the convention of the world; the Śaivas as Śiva; the Vaiṣnavas as Puruṣottama; the Mīmāṃsakas as the One to whom sacrifice is due; the Naiyāyikas as the Being endowed with all the attributes which befit him; the Cārvākas as the One whose existence is established by the common consent of the world; . . . with regard to the existence of that Being, the adorable Śiva, whose power is as universally acknowledged as are castes, families . . . social customs, etc., I ask how can there arise any doubt?'

Yet, according to Udayana, a five-fold objection is raised against the existence of God; the answer to these objections forms the subject of the five chapters of the *Kusumāñjali*. Udayana's exposition is very complicated, because he treats many rival theories, which are not always directly related to the subject. In the first chapter, e.g., his primary aim is to prove the existence of karma, but he there refutes several other theories of adversaries who admit its existence. For the present we need not explain all these discussions with their implications; it will be sufficient if we indicate the positive arguments of Udayana in order to compare them with those of his predecessors.

Among the five arguments for the existence of karma, exposed in the first chapter, two may, however, be mentioned here. The first may be summarized as follows: 'This world, full of various kinds of sorrow, must be dependent on something else. It cannot be independent (*nirapekṣa*). If it were, it would either be only existing or only non-existing, but it could not

have an occasional existence.' In the ensuing discussion on causality, the contingency (*kādācitatvam*) of this world is said to postulate the existence of a cause. In his third argument, Udayana again mentions the universal practice (of performing sacrifices) as a sufficient proof of the existence of a supra-sensible world: 'This universal practice cannot be meaningless and ineffectual' (*viphalā viśvavṛttir no*, p. 34).

The last chapter of the book contains eight different proofs for the existence of God, condensed in the first *kārikā* and developed up to the end of the fifth *kārikā*. Then Udayana gives a new scriptural interpretation of his eight proofs and incidentally criticizes the Mīmāṃsakas. The eighth direct proofs are the following:—

(1) *Kārya—Effect.*

'The earth, etc., postulates a maker, because it is an effect' (*kṣity-ādi kartṛpūrvakam kāryatvāt*, V, p. 1). This is the proof of Vācaspati, the only one which is discussed at some length by Udayana. Udayana also deals at some length with the objection that 'God, not being endowed with a body, cannot be a maker'.

(2) *Ayojana—Combination.*

'In every creation, the atoms combine to produce the visible universe. Being devoid of intelligence, they cannot produce this effect by themselves, but have to be directed by an intelligent agent.' This is the proof of Uddyotakara, and of Praśastapāda who also ascribes creation to the will of God.

(3) *Dhṛtyādi—Support, etc.*

Here Udayana has two proofs: support (*dhṛti*) and destruction (*saṃharaṇam*). The support and the destruction of the world are effected by the activity of the Supreme Divinity (*prayatnādhiṣṭhitam*). This idea is already found in Praśastapāda.

(4) *Pada—The traditional Arts.*

The elements of culture have to be taught to mankind at the beginning of each new creation, since there is at that time a complete absence of all patterns (*kalpādav-ādarś-ābhāsasy-āpy-asiddheḥ*, V, p. 61). For this reason God at intervals assumes a body and manifests His glory (*grhṇāti h-iśvaro'pi kāryavaśāt śarīram-antarāntarā, darśayati vibhūtim*, V, p. 61). The idea of God assuming a body to teach mankind has been borrowed from Yoga (cf. supra Ch. IV); the terminology used by Udayana confirms this.

(5) *Pratyaya—Authoritativeness.*

'Scripture imparts valid knowledge and must therefore have a cause, to which it owes its function of being the source of valid knowledge' (*āgama-sampradāyo' yam kāraṇaguṇa-pūrvakam pramāṇatvāt*, V, p. 62).

(6) *Śruti—Revelation.*

'The Vedas must have been composed by an all-knowing Being (*sarvajña-pranītā vedāḥ*, V, p. 62) because they possess the character of revelation (*vedatva*). They are accepted as revealed by the majority (or by eminent men, *mahājana*) and can have no other source but God.'

(7) *Vākyatva—The Nature of Sentence.*

'The Vedas must have been produced by a person, since they consist of sentences, similar to the sentences of beings like ourselves' (*vedavākyaṇi pauruṣeṇāni vākyatvād-asmadādi-vākyaavat*, V, p. 63).

(8) *Saṃkhyā—Number.*

This proof is based on two theories of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, which we have already exposed. Both are found in *Prāśastapāda* for the first time. The extension of the molecules is not produced by the atoms for they have no extension; but it is produced by the 'trinality' of three binary atoms. This 'trinality', however, has no absolute existence but depends on the relating power of an intellect (*apekṣā-buddhi*). The 'shortness' (*hrasvatva*) of the binary atoms is due to the duality of the two simple atoms of which they consist. This 'duality' depends for its existence on an intellect. Consequently, at the beginning of creation, the binary atoms and the molecules can only come into existence with the help of God's intellect which possesses the intellectual representation of 'duality' and 'trinality'.

These eight proofs bring in no new philosophical arguments for the existence of God, and we fully agree with the remark of Prof. H. Jacobi, that the strength of Udayana's work lies chiefly in his refutation of the rival theories. As a matter of fact, three of the proofs, based on the existence and the validity of Scripture (5, 6, 7), are theological arguments; the fourth has been borrowed from Yoga, the last from *Prāśastapāda*, the first from *Vācaspati*, the second from *Uddyotakara* and *Prāśastapāda*.

CHAPTER VII

THE NATURE OF GOD

(1) VĀTSYĀYANA AND PRĀŚASTAPĀDA.

The *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* is the first work of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika which contains a description of the divine nature (cf. N.Bh., 4, 1, 21).

God is said to be a special soul, in whom there is no demerit (*adharma* or bad *karma*), no error (*mithyā jñāna*) and no negligence or inadvertence (*pramāda*). On the other hand, God's most characteristic quality is knowledge; He also possesses concentration (*saṃādhi*) and merit (*dharma* or good *karma*). His omnipotence (*aīśvarya*, lit. lordly power), which consists in the eight magical powers (*aṇiman*, etc.), is due to this merit and concentration. This merit conforms to His wishes (it is *saṃkalpānuvidhāyī*) and actuates (*pravartayati*) not only the accumulated merit and demerit (i.e. the *karma*) of each individual soul but also the earth and the other elements.

God creates according to the law of *karma*, giving each being the fruit of its actions; yet He is perfectly free when creating, 'since *karma* is made by Him'.¹ He has no unfulfilled desires, but as a father acts on behalf of his children, so does God act for the sake of His creatures.

¹ This is the most probable interpretation of the text, which may also mean: 'Since God creates through the instrumentality of His own *karma*, which He Himself made and which conforms to His wishes.' Cf. next chapter.

We have already pointed out that the terminology chosen by Uddyotakara and Vācaspati with regard to God, as revealer of the Vedas, clearly proves that they borrowed their views from Yoga; here again we meet with technical terms of Yoga: *pramāda*, *samādhi*, the eight *siddhis*, *prākāmyam* (freedom of God in creating). Knowledge, as the characteristic quality of Īśvara, is also a familiar idea of Yoga (Y.S., I, 25).

Prāsaṣtapāda does not attempt to give a description of God's nature as Vātsyāyana had done; we, therefore, know very little about his philosophical concept of God. He ascribes periodical creation and dissolution to the desire of Maheśvara (*siṣṭkṣā*—desire to create, *saṃjihīṣā*—desire to destroy), who creates the world for the sake of the experience gained by living beings (*prāṇinām bhogabhūṭaye*) and destroys it again to give these same beings a rest, wearied as they are by their transmigrations (*saṃsāra-khinnānām sarvaprāṇinām niśi viśrāmārtham*, p. 277). Prāsaṣtapāda refers also to the creative power of God's intellect, as we have explained above (Ch. IV and VI). It is God's intellect (*apekṣā-buddhi*) which is responsible for the duality and plurality in the atoms (the latter being necessary for the extension of molecules); further, after the production of the four gross elements (*mahābhūta*) in the process of creation, the great egg is brought into existence, out of the fire and earth-atoms, *by the mere thought of Maheśvara* (*maheśvarasya-abhidhyāna-mātrāt*, p. 277).

But Maheśvara is not classified under any category, and His desire and His knowledge are not mentioned by Prāsaṣtapāda when he speaks *ex professo* of the qualities. He distinguishes, e.g., four kinds of knowledge, the highest (*ārṣa*) being that of the Sages, who have composed the Vedas (p. 621). This knowledge perceives past, present, and future events and extends to such supra-sensible entities as merit; but as it is due to special merit and is caused by the contact of the soul and the mind (*manas*—inner organ), it cannot be ascribed to the divine intellect.

Prāsaṣtapāda's concept of God is therefore religious rather than philosophical. God is the Great Lord (*Maheśvara*), the Ruler of all the worlds (*Sakala-bhuvana-pati*, p. 277), who creates and destroys for the sake of others.

The difficulty of reconciling God's power with the rigid law of karma has not been realized by Prāsaṣtapāda. He simply states that, during the dissolution, the souls remain imbued by the impression of merit and demerit (*dharmā-adharma-saṃskāra-anuviddhāḥ*): at the time of creation Maheśvara produces *Brahmā* and assigns to him the task of creating the various beings according to their previous deeds (*prāṇinām karmavipākam viditvā*, p. 273).

It is the description of God's nature given by Vātsyāyana, which has been taken up and developed by the subsequent authors. In the following pages we shall analyze the nature of God as it has been conceived by Uddyotakara and Vācaspati; divergences of later Naiyāyikas of the old school are also referred to.

In order to be both clear and complete we have first noted all the differences that exist between God and the common soul; next, we complete this negative description by a positive exposition of God's eight qualities and His other attributes. On account of its special importance we deal with the problem of 'Īśvara versus karma' in the next chapter.

(2) DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ĪŚVARA AND COMMON SOULS.

In order to understand the description of God's nature in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, it should be remembered that the system had already taken a definite shape when the existence of God was accepted by it. Uddyotakara

is the first Naiyāyika to give a systematic description of the divine nature; in his time the number of categories, the nine substances and their qualities, as exposed by Prāśastapāda, had been generally accepted. The author of the *Vārtika* had therefore no other choice but to examine under which category Īśvara could be classified and which qualities applied to Him. Characteristically he opens his investigation into the nature of God by saying: 'Since we possess no exact knowledge about the nature of God, the doubt arises whether He is a substance, a quality or one of the other categories' (*tat-svabhāv-ānavadhāraṇāt sandehaḥ īśvaraḥ kim dravyamāho guṇādīnam anyatam iti*, p. 464).

Applying the method of Vaiśeṣika, which describes the essence of the categories 'by means of their resemblances and differences' (*sādharmya-vaidharmyābhyām*, VS., I, 1, 4), Uddyotakara now proceeds to analyze which qualities of the common soul belong to God and which do not.

Īśvara is not a common soul because He has qualities that differ from those of the soul (*guṇabhedāt*, p. 464), the chief difference and superiority consisting in the eternity of His knowledge (*atiśayas tu buddhinitiyatvam guṇabhedā*, *ibid.*). Consequently, Uddyotakara holds that God possesses six qualities: knowledge and the five generic qualities. But he also speaks of God's activity and desire and acknowledges that there are therefore eight qualities in God, (five generic and three specific), an opinion that Vācaspati will later follow. We shall describe these eight qualities of Īśvara in the next section.

Common souls have nine specific qualities, six of these do not belong to God, viz. pleasure, pain, aversion (*dveṣa*), impression (*saṃskāra*), merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*). Three of them, viz. demerit and its consequences, pain and aversion, are naturally not ascribed to God by the Naiyāyikas. The school also agrees with Uddyotakara in eliminating impression (*saṃskāra*), which is the cause of remembrance; 'since God's intellection is eternal it leaves no impression' (*nityam vijñānam Īśvarasya-iti na tatra saṃskāra vidyate*, p. 465).

There is no unanimity concerning the qualities merit and pleasure. Merit (*dharma*) is explicitly rejected by Uddyotakara and Vācaspati; but it had been accepted by Vātsyāyana, and was later attributed again to God by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his *Nyāya-Mañjari* (p. 185).

Pleasure (*sukha*), although it is not explicitly rejected, is not attributed as a quality to God, neither by Uddyotakara nor by Vācaspati. Nor was it ascribed to God by other Naiyāyikas generally speaking. Although Udayana calls God, the Ocean of joy (*Ānandanidhi*) in the last *kārikā* of his *Kuṣumāñjali*, he holds that there are only three specific qualities in Īśvara; Śrīdhara explicitly affirms that pleasure is not found in God; but the *Nyāya-Sāra* and the *Nyāya-Mañjari* attribute it to God. The *Nyāya-Sāra* refers to pleasure when proving that liberation consists in pleasurable consciousness (p. 97); Jayanta Bhaṭṭa infers its existence in God from Scripture (where Īśvara is called *Nityānanda*) and from reason. An Īśvara without pleasure would be unfit to begin the work of creation (*asukhitasya c-aivaṃ-vidha-kāry-ārambha-yogyat-ābhāvāt*, p. 185).

Uddyotakara mentions a few more differences between God and the common soul. Since Īśvara does not experience pain, He is not bound to earthly existence; nor is He indifferent to the world (He possesses no *vairāgyam*). He cannot be called 'liberated' (*mukta*) since He was never bound. Uddyotakara is also the first to prove that God is not endowed with a body. He proves this point when refuting the objection that knowledge is connected with the possession of a body (p. 535). He may be arguing here against Yoga which, as we have seen, teaches that Īśvara

assumes a *sattva* of perfect quality. If God had a body, argues Uddyotakara, that body would be either eternal or non-eternal. But a non-eternal body would mean that God possessed merit and demerit (as causes of His body); in that case He would be subject to merit and demerit and consequently He would no more be the Lord (*tad-abhyupagame ca tat-tantratvād Īśvaro neśvaraḥ syāt*, p. 465). An eternal body, on the other hand, is contrary to our experience; we can as well admit the eternity of knowledge (without a body). We have seen in Ch. VI how Vācaspati answers the objection that knowledge postulates a body. Udayana, too, deals at some length with this objection and maintains that God is not endowed with a body of His own; he adds, however, that at the beginning of each new creation God assumes a body to teach the traditional arts.

(3) THE EIGHT QUALITIES OF ĪŚVARA.

(a) *The five Generic Qualities (sāmānya guṇa).*

God belongs to the category substance; consequently the *five generic qualities*, common to all substances, material and immaterial, are attributed to Him. Uddyotakara, who is the first to point this out, does not explain how these qualities apply to Īśvara; he has borrowed this theory of generic qualities from Praśastapāda, and he simply states the fact that they belong to God. Later Naiyāyikas are not more explicit. Those five generic qualities are Number (*saṃkhyā*), Dimension (*parimāṇa*), Individuality (*prthaktva*), Conjunction (*saṃyoga*) and Disjunction (*vibhāga*). They have already been described in the third chapter of this book. In the mind of the Naiyāyikas, they are of no consequence for the concept of God's nature.

(b) *Knowledge (buddhi).*

Among the three specific qualities ascribed to God, *knowledge* is considered by the Naiyāyikas to be the most characteristic and also the most important.

Both Vātsyāyana and Praśastapāda mention the knowledge of God (cf. *supra* sect. 1) without, however, describing in what it consists. Uddyotakara teaches that this knowledge is eternal and that through it all things, past, present, and future are directly perceived; God has therefore no memory. God does not obtain His knowledge through inference or scripture; Vācaspati further adds that God's knowledge is not acquired through any of the four *pramāṇas*—inference, scripture, perception or analogy. It is not dependent on the senses, since it is eternal (*na punar-akṣam āśritā nityatvāt*, p. 591); it is based on direct intuition (*sākṣātkāravatī*). The knowledge of Īśvara as conceived by Uddyotakara and Vācaspati is therefore fundamentally different from that of common souls: it is eternal; it perceives simultaneously all things material and immaterial such as for instance the atoms and the karma-residues of the individual souls.

Uddyotakara's proof of the eternity of God's knowledge is based on the Nyāya-theory that our acts of cognition are evanescent (N.S., 3, 2, 40–45); they form a series of distinct intellections (*santāna-vartinī*), limited to one object at a time (*praty-artha-niyatā*, N.V., p. 465). God's knowledge cannot be of such a nature because in that case the simultaneous production of many effects would be impossible; hence we conclude that God's knowledge is eternal. If you maintain, Uddyotakara concludes, that a series of distinct evanescent intellections can embrace all things, then you admit something which is contrary to our experience; you might just

as well admit that God's knowledge is eternal (*atha santāna-vartinyaḥ sarvārthāḥ buddhaya bhavanti? evamapi drṣṭa-viparītam kalpitam*, *ibid.*).

We have already seen (Ch. VI) how Vācaspati argues that the simultaneous production of many effects of so great a variety postulates an omniscient Maker of the world, whose knowledge is uncaused and therefore eternal. When dealing with the qualities of God, Vācaspati infers God's eternal omniscience through a process of elimination (*pariśeṣānumāna*, p. 604), in which, however, no new considerations are introduced: 'No one having only a non-eternal, limited intelligence, can possess a sufficient knowledge of the material that constitutes the world, or can perceive the atoms and the karma-residues of the individual souls; hence the maker of the world is an eternally omniscient Īśvara.'

This eternal knowledge was considered of such importance by later Naiyāyikas that Śrīdhara mentions a school of thought, which was said to hold that knowledge was the only specific quality of God: 'Others hold that His unthwarted intelligence constitutes His power; they do not admit desire and activity and teach that God possesses only six qualities' (*anye tu buddhir eva tasyāvyāhatā kriyā-śaktir ityevam vadanta icchā-prayatnāvapy-anāṅgikurvāṇāḥ, śaḍguṇ-ādhikaraṇaṇ'yam ity āhuḥ*, p. 57).

(c) *Desire (icchā) and Activity (prayatna).*

The *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* had indirectly admitted the existence of desire in Īśvara, when it said that God's merit conforms to His wishes (*saṃkalpa*); Prāśastapāda, too, mentions God's desire to create and to destroy (*śiṣṭkṣā* and *saṃjīhīrṣā*). Uddyotakara, however, is the first to use the word *icchā*. Īśvara has desire, which is as untainted and unimpeded as is His knowledge (*icchā tu vidyate, akliṣṭā avyāhatā sarvārtheṣu yathā buddhir*, p. 466). In the explanation of the above statement Vācaspati says that God's desire is untainted by ignorance (*avidyā*); he uses both *icchā* and *cikīrṣā* (desire to make) to designate that desire. Śrīdhara adds that the desire of Īśvara is one and eternal. It produces numberless effects, at one time destruction, at another creation; but this is due to a difference of circumstances (p. 52).

The last specific quality of Īśvara, viz. *prayatna*, is perhaps best translated as activity. Prof. H. Jacobi defines *prayatna*: the will in as far as it is in the act of execution; Prof. A. B. Keith translates it as volition.¹ Vācaspati is the first to use the word *prayatna* for Īśvara, but Uddyotakara, though he does not use the word, also admits that *prayatna* belongs to God when he says that activity pertains to God's very essence (*pravṛtti-svābhāvikam tat-tattvam*, p. 463).

Finally, we must point out to the reader that the three specific qualities of Īśvara, viz. intellect, desire and activity (volition) are not conceived as independent of one another. We have already seen that, according to Śrīdhara, later Naiyāyikas taught that God's unimpeded knowledge also constitutes His power. Śrīdhara himself speaks of God's desire as a power to act (*kriyā-śaktirūpa*, p. 52). Uddyotakara points out that God's desire is unimpeded (*avyāhatā sarvārtheṣu*), and Vācaspati mentions the intimate and inseparable connection between knowledge, desire and activity; so much so, that the existence of knowledge in God also proves the existence of the two other qualities. 'God's desire and activity are as eternal as

¹ Cf. Entw., p. 57 and I.L.A., p. 249. To Prāśastapāda *prayatna* is synonymous with *saṃrambha* and *utsāha* and clearly means physical activity. It is twofold: *jīvana-pūrvaka*, proceeding from mere life, as the breathing of a sleeping man and *icchā-dveṣa-pūrvaka* which is defined as an activity (*vyapāra*) proceeding from desire or aversion (Pr.Bh., p. 628).

His knowledge and must therefore be considered as implied in the proof that He is the Maker (of the world). The reason is that being a maker consists in the inseparable connection of knowledge, desire and activity; and since these three qualities are inseparably connected with one another, the ascertainment of one of them proves the existence of the two others also' (*jñāna-cikīrṣā-prayatna-samavāya-lakṣaṇatvāt kartrtvasya teṣāṃ ca paraspar-āvinābhāvād anyatara-siddhau itarayoḥ siddheḥ*, p. 604).

(4) OTHER ATTRIBUTES OF ĪŚVARA

(a) *Unicity.*

Uddyotakara is the first Naiyāyika to point out the unicity of God; he gives the same argument for it as is used by the *Yoga-Bhāṣya* (cf. Ch. IV). 'What is the objection against there being several gods? If two gods have opposing wishes with regard to one and the same object, then there can be no activity (and neither can be called God). If one, however, prevails in His wish, then He is the Īśvara and not the other' (p. 464).

Vācaspati, too, asks the question: why can there be only one Maker?—but he gives another reason for the unicity of God. Instead of supposing the existence of many beings different from us and capable of perceiving supra-sensible entities (as atoms and karma-residues) it is better to accept only one such being, viz. Īśvara, because of the simplicity of the assumption (*kalpanā-lāghava*, p. 601).

(b) *Omnipotence (aiśvarya).*

The *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* is the first document of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to mention the omnipotence (lit. the lordly power) of Īśvara. It is evident that Vātsyāyana borrowed this idea from Yoga, because he says that God's omnipotence consists in the eight magical powers (*aṇiman*, etc.) usually ascribed to the Yogis. We have seen above how this attribute of God was conceived and developed in the Yoga-system; God's omnipotence is founded on the fact that He assumes a pure *sattva*, and it consists in His perfect power to know and to act (cf. Ch. IV).

According to Vātsyāyana, God's omnipotence springs from His merit; this merit is the instrument by which Īśvara exercises His magical powers and actuates the individual karma of men, the earth and the other elements (cf. *supra* 1). Both Uddyotakara and Vācaspati expose their own views on God's *aiśvarya*, when they comment on the above statement of Vātsyāyana; they explain that there is no need to postulate merit as an instrument of God's activity.

Uddyotakara teaches that God's omnipotence is eternal and therefore not caused by His merit (p. 464); he explains Īśvara's control of karma by pointing to the relation between God and individual souls (*aja-sambandha*, lit. un-produced relation, p. 466). He is not able to decide whether this relation is all-pervading (*vyāpaka*) or not, i.e. whether or not it entirely pervades God and the soul; for, he adds, there is no sense in this consideration (*arthābhāvāt*, *ibid.*). 'Only this can be said, that there exists a relation between God and the individual soul' (*atmeśvara-sambandho 'st-ity-etad eva śakyate vaktum*, *ibid.*).

In his commentary on the *Yoga-Bhāṣya* Vācaspati defines the omnipotence of God as the perfect power to know and to act. He uses the same expression (*jñāna-kriyāśakti*) when he states that all effects whatsoever are sufficiently accounted for by God's eternal knowledge and power, and that there is therefore no need to admit any merit in Īśvara (*nityābhyām eva jñāna-kriyāśaktibhyām sakala-kāryotpāda-siddheḥ*, *Tātparyā-Tīkā*, p. 597).

God's knowledge and His power to act are eternal; consequently His omnipotence is also eternal (*tasya hi jñāna-kriyāśakti nityeti aiśvaryam nityam*, *ibid.*).

Vācaspati repeats Uddyotakara's theory of the relation between God and the soul, to explain the directing of karma. This relation may be conceived as an indirect inherence (*saṃyukta-saṃyogi-samavāya*), the intermediary necessary for the relation being the atoms; these atoms are united both to God and to the soul. The relation may also be conceived as a direct and eternal union between Īśvara and the soul (*ajā-saṃyoga*).¹ The author, however, seems to prefer another solution; God may also actuate karma and the atoms (without any intermediary) as the poison is actuated by one who knows the science of poison (*ibid.*, p. 604).

(c) *God's motive in creating.*

It has already been proved in our Fourth Chapter that the Vedas were not originally conceived as being revealed by Īśvara. Uddyotakara clearly insinuates the question of revelation, but it is Vācaspati who is the first to teach, explicitly, that the Maker of the universe revealed the Vedas out of mercy for ignorant mankind. This teaching was borrowed from Yoga. The *Nyāya-Bhāṣya*, which also borrowed its description of the divine nature from Yoga, attributed the same mercy to Īśvara as the motive of His actuation of karma, the earth and the other elements. Although God has no unfulfilled desires (He is *āptakalpa*), yet as a father acts for his children, so does He act for His creatures (*yathā pitāpatyānām tathā pitṛ-bhūta Īśvaro bhūtānām*, N.Bh., IV, 1, 21). Prāśastapāda, too, states that God creates for the sake of others (*cf. supra* 1).

Uddyotakara, however, does not ascribe this motive to God. He conceived creation and the dependence of Īśvara on karma as something too mechanical and too rigid to allow of this motive of mercy in God. God creates, simply because activity belongs to His nature, just as it belongs to the nature of the earth to support, and to the nature of water to wet, etc. (*tatsvabhāvāt pravartata ity-adṛṣtam yathā bhūmy-ādīni dhāraṇādi kriyām tat-svabhāvāt kurvanti tath-ēśvaro'pi*, *Vārtika*, p. 463). The reasons given by Uddyotakara why Īśvara does not create out of sport or in order to manifest His glory have been mentioned in our previous chapter.

Vācaspati accepts the view of Vātsyāyana and Prāśastapāda, as do later Naiyāyikas; God creates the world, directs karma and reveals the Vedas for the sake of others; His entire activity is motivated by His mercy. But if this is true, Vācaspati asks, why does Īśvara not create a world without suffering, why does He actuate karma to produce evil results? This brings us to the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER VIII

ĪŚVARA *versus* KARMA

(1) THE DOCTRINE OF KARMA-SAMSĀRA.

The origin of the doctrine of Karma and Reincarnation and the reason of its general acceptance in India are still unsolved problems. Did the invading Aryans borrow this teaching from earlier animistic beliefs or was

¹ A direct and eternal conjunction (*saṃyoga*) between all-pervading substances is not in harmony with the general teaching of the system (*cf. Ch. III*).

it the outcome of their own speculations on the destiny of man after death? A. M. Boyer¹ favours the latter opinion and shows how already in the R̥gveda immortality in the other world was conceived as due to merit; this led naturally to the idea of re-death (*punar-mṛtyu*) in the other world due to the exhaustion of merit—an idea that is affirmed repeatedly in the tenth book of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*. This vague idea of re-death took a more definite shape in the Upaniṣads, where re-birth into this world is clearly referred to.

That the doctrine of Karma-Samsāra evolved as is described above is quite possible; as a matter of fact the doctrine of karma and re-birth finds its first expression in the *Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*: 'Verily one becomes good by good action, bad by bad action' (3, 2, 13) and more explicitly: 'According as one acts, according as one conducts himself, so does he become. The doer of good becomes good. The doer of evil becomes evil. One becomes virtuous by virtuous action, bad by bad action. But people say: "A man is made (not of acts, but) of desires only." (In reply to this I say): "As is his desire, such is his resolve; as is his resolve, such the action he performs; what action (karma) he performs, that he procures for himself" (4, 4, 5).' The above extract expresses only the fact that our deeds shape our destiny; the following verse, however, refers to a return into this world:

'Obtaining the end of his action
Whatever he does in this world
He comes again from that world
To this world of action' (4, 4, 6).

Although it is far from being a settled dogma in Upaniṣad-literature,² the Karma-Samsāra doctrine grew into a general belief and was subsequently accepted by Buddhism and by all the orthodox philosophical systems. Karma is the invisible power which automatically causes all action (good or bad) to be rewarded or punished (mostly) in a subsequent re-birth. This cycle of birth and death (*samsāra*) is without beginning and all beings are subject to its inexorable law.

This doctrine is very clearly stated in both the *Vaiśeṣika* and the *Nyāya-Sūtras*. *Adṛṣṭa* or karma is the unseen force which moves the atoms and the mind (V.S., 5, 2, 13) and which is the cause of re-birth (V.S., 5, 2, 15). The *Nyāya-Sūtras* devote thirteen aphorisms to prove that karma is the cause of the formation of the body and also of the connection of that body with a particular soul (3, 2, 60-72). All subsequent Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika authors accept this teaching and explain the diversity of human destiny as being the result of the deeds of a previous birth. Since these authors also accept the existence of Īśvara, the Supreme Lord and Creator of the Universe, they must somehow subordinate this law of karma to His control. Originally conceived as an autonomous law of nature, karma is now said to be actuated by Īśvara. The difficulties, inherent in this theory, were only gradually realized, as we shall see from the various solutions of the problem, proposed by the Naiyāyikas.

(2) THE SŪTRAS AND THE BHĀṢYA.

The solution of the problem 'Īśvara versus karma' given in the theistic sūtras has been interpreted in two ways. The first: 'Barring a few exceptions, karma exercises an efficient causality; but it can do this only because

¹ Cf. Etudes sur l'origine du Samsāra, Extr. du J.A., Paris, 1902.

² Cf. A. B. Keith, Religion and Phil. of the Veda, Harvard U.P., 1925, p. 574.

it is actuated by Īśvara.' This involves the self-contradiction pointed out in Chapter V. The other solution is the one adopted by subsequent Naiyāyikas: 'Karma does not admit of exceptions; it influences man's destiny always, but it is actuated by Īśvara in doing this. God is therefore the Lord, even of karma.' In either case, the sūtras simply subordinate karma to Īśvara, without touching any of the problems involved.

Commenting on the sūtras, Vātsyāyana teaches that man's effort, although not necessarily efficacious, is nevertheless indispensable for the attainment of his object. Man's effort is taken up by God, who may or may not grant success. This implies human and divine freedom. The commentary concludes by stating that karma is an efficient cause in the production of the body. Vātsyāyana, as all later Nyāya authors, is very anxious to hold that God cannot act irrespectively of karma, that every being receives the fruit of its deeds. He therefore maintains the efficient causality of individual karma. Man does shape his own destiny; his deeds influence his future re-birth. Yet, God is said to be perfectly free with regard to His creation, and to create for the sake of His creatures. The fact that God creates according to individual karma, giving each person the due reward of his deeds, does not interfere with His freedom. The reason advanced in support of this view is not very clear: 'God's merit, which conforms to His will, actuates the accumulated merit and demerit of individual souls, and also the earth and the other elements. Thus, without doing away with the law of retribution, God's freedom in creating is to be considered as the result of self-made karma' (*evaṃ ca svakṛt-ābhya-gamasy-ālopena nirmāṇa-prakāmyaṃ Īśvarasya-karma-phalaṃ veditavyaṃ*, 4, 1, 21). Does this mean 'God is free when creating, because He creates with His own karma, which He Himself made, and which, as we know, conforms to His wishes, His freedom therefore being the result of His own karma'? Possibly, but then Vātsyāyana does not explain why God's karma conforms perfectly to the karma of others; further, dharmā only, not karma, is ascribed to God, by the Bhāṣya. The above passage may mean: '(Although God conforms to the karma of others, yet) He is free because He Himself made (actuated) the karma of the others.' God must therefore be considered free, since He only conforms to what He Himself has made (and willed). This is the solution evolved by Uddyotakara.

In any case the *Nyāya-Bhāṣya*, too, affirms God's freedom, and teaches His sovereignty over the law of karma. It also teaches that God creates for the sake of others. It does not yet realize, however, the difficulty later formulated by Vācaspati: 'If God creates solely out of mercy, how is it that He actuates karma to produce evil results?'

(3) THE SOLUTION OF UDDYOTAKARA.

The author of the *Vārtika* gives a lengthy analysis of the relation between Īśvara and karma. The following exposition of his views is taken from his commentary on the theistic sūtras (cf. Ch. V), from his arguments for the existence of God (cf. Ch. VI) and from his description of the divine nature (cf. Ch. VII).

Karma is for man the instrumental cause of happiness and sorrow; being unintelligent, it must be directed in this causality by an intelligent agent. This intelligent agent is not man himself; it must therefore be Īśvara. Īśvara, however, is not an independent creator; if God were independent of everything in creating the world, He would act towards all beings in like manner, since He is of a uniform nature (*ekarūpatvāt*). But this, God does not do. Moreover karma would be futile; there would

be no retribution for the deeds done by man and liberation would become impossible. Consequently, God is dependent (*sāpekṣa*) on karma for His creation. This dependence on karma, as conceived by Uddyotakara, makes God the helpless controller of an immutable law. In his commentary on sūtra 21, he explains the sentence 'God supports, takes up the karma of man' (*puruṣakarma Īśvaro'nugrṇāti*) as follows: 'God apportions to each the proper fruit at the time of fruition' (*yad-yathābhūtam yasya ca yadā vipākakālah, tat-tathā tadā viniyunkte*, p. 456). God, moreover, does not create for the sake of others, as the *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* has maintained, but simply because activity belongs to His nature (*pravṛttisvābhāvikaṃ tat-tattvam*, p. 463). This implies that God necessarily performs the function of controlling the law of karma. In Chapter VI we mentioned the five conditions which have to be fulfilled before God can exercise any activity, and which leave no spontaneity whatever to the Creator and Controller of the universe.

It is difficult to see how in this solution God can still be said to be the Lord. The opponent rightly objects: 'If God is dependent on karma when producing the world, then He is not the Lord with regard to karma' (*evam karma-sāpekṣas ced-īśvaro jagad-utpatti-kāraṇam syāt, karman-īśvaro n-eśvaraḥ syāt*). Uddyotakara's answer to the above objection has been exposed in Ch. VI and is not to the point. First of all, he formulates the objection differently in order to be able to give at least some sort of an answer: 'If God is dependent, then He is not the maker of that with the help of which He creates' (*yadi sāpekṣaḥ? yena karoti tasy-ākartā*, p. 461). 'The reason given', Uddyotakara replies, 'is not without exceptions'. A man may make his own instruments first, and therefore be the maker of the things with the help of which he makes other things.

Similarly, whenever God creates according to a previous karma, it is God Himself who has brought that karma into existence with the help of the previous body. That previous body was again made by God with the help of a previous karma, etc. Therefore whenever God creates, He uses instruments which He Himself has made. Thus the reason given by the opponent is not valid. There is no first creation, and it is futile to argue on the supposition that there is one.

This answer implies that according to the law of karma God's activity is without beginning, but it does not supply us with any explanation of this beginningless agreement with karma. It does not show how Īśvara can still be called the Lord of karma. Īśvara can exert his lordly powers only according to a rigid law, conceived as existing independently of Him. It is therefore not Īśvara but karma which rules the universe.

(4) THE SOLUTION OF VĀCASPATI.

Vācaspati has considerably modified the above solution of Uddyotakara, and tries to lessen the rigidity with which Īśvara is supposed to conform to the law of karma.

The solution in its broad outlines is formulated by him as follows: God, conditioned by karma, is the efficient cause of the world; but this does not make karma autonomous, because also karma has God for its efficient cause (*puruṣakarm-āpekṣa Īśvaro nimittakāraṇam yac-ca ten-āpekṣaṇīyaṃ puruṣakarma tadap-īśvara-nimittikaṃ*, p. 594). Īśvara creates, not because activity belongs to His nature, as Uddyotakara had taught, but for the sake of helping others (*par-ānugrah-ārtham*, p. 595). God acts in the creation of the world as a father does for his children; Vācaspati therefore suggests the same motive of creation as that given by the *Nyāya-Bhāṣya*. But now a serious difficulty presents itself. God's sovereignty

has been vindicated; He is the efficient cause of karma, who, out of mercy, creates the world. But, if God creates the world out of mercy, He would create only happy, and no unhappy men (*yādi kārūṇyādīśvaro jagad-nirmāṇe pravartate hanta bhoḥ sukhinam eva sṛjen-na tu duḥkkinam*, p. 595). We cannot blame the karma of individual souls for the sorrows of this world because karma cannot exert any causality without being actuated by God. A merciful God therefore should guide karma in such a way as to prevent its producing sorrow. Vācaspati, in his answer to this objection, does not dare to put the responsibility of a sorrowful world on God and consequently diminishes His sovereignty. 'Although God is merciful and although His power exceeds by far that of ordinary souls, yet God cannot change the nature of things. . . . God, who does not disregard the destiny of man, cannot help actuating the demerit of individual souls (to produce sorrow). Acting according to the nature of things, God, although merciful, produces the diversity of the world with the help of merit and demerit' (*kārūṇiko 'pi ayam ātmāntar-ātiśayita-mahimāpi na vastūnām sāmāthyam anyathā kartum pārāyati kṣetrajñānām niyatim alaṅghayatā īśvareṇa nādharmah śakyo' nadhiṣṭhātum. Tasmāt kārūṇiko'py-ayam vastu-svabhāvam anuvīdhīyamāno dharmādharma-sahakāri jagad-vaicitryam vidhatte*, p. 596).

The above quotation takes us a step closer to Uddyotakara's interpretation of the dependence of God on karma. Fortunately we can still quote another text, where Vācaspati clearly shows that he does not agree with Uddyotakara's determinism. Commenting on the sentence 'God is active because activity belongs to His nature', Vācaspati observes: 'Although God is intelligent and compassionate by nature, yet He conforms Himself to the nature of things and produces the diversity of the world according to the karma-residues. He does not necessarily impede man's bad activity' (*cetano'py-ayam parānugraha-svabhāvo 'pi vastu-svabhāvam anurudhyamānah karmāśay-ānurodhena jagad-vaicitryam vidhatte, na cāvaśyam duṣkṛte puṃsām pravṛttim vihanṭīty-arthaḥ*, p. 597).

According to this, Vācaspati's meaning might be that God necessarily punishes evil deeds once they are committed, but that He is capable of preventing them. Since 'God does not necessarily prevent evil deeds', as Vācaspati expressly states, this implies that God could prevent them but does not want to interfere with human freedom. If that is the case, God must be held responsible for allowing evil, and since He does allow evil out of mercy, He must have a good reason for doing so. That evil is allowed for the sake of good is not taught by Vācaspati, unless it be implied in the general statement that God creates this world out of mercy. Śrīdhara, however, touches this point and states that pain serves the useful purpose of detaching man's mind from the things of this world (*duḥkhotpādasya vairāgya-janana-dvāreṇa paramapurusaārtha-hetutvāt—Nyāya-Kandālī*, p. 53). The same author vindicates God's omnipotence, in spite of the admission that God has to conform to the law of karma. The vindication runs as follows: 'How could He cease to be the Supreme Lord, by bestowing upon beings rewards that are in accordance with their respective deeds? For certainly, the master does not cease to be a master by making awards to his servants in accordance with their merits' (*sa hi sarva-prāṇinām karm-ānurūpaṃ phalaṃ prayacchan katham anīśvaraḥ syād iti bhāvaḥ. na hi yogyatānurūpyena bhṛtyānām phala-viśeṣapradāḥ prabhur-aprabhur-bhāvati*, *ibid.*).

COMPARATIVE CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

Century	YOGA	VAIŚEṢIKA	NYĀYA
3rd B.C.	Theistic schools		
2nd B.C.	PATAÑJALI? Yoga-Sūtras	Vaiśeṣika schools	Nyāya schools
1st B.C.			
1st A.D.		KANĀDA Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras	
2nd A.D.			GAUTAMA Nyāya-Sūtras
3rd A.D.			
4th A.D.			VĀTSYĀYANA Nyāya-Bhāṣya
5th A.D.	PATAÑJALI? Yoga-Sūtras	PRAŚASTAPĀDA Praśastapāda-Bhāṣya	
6th A.D.	VYĀSA Yoga-Bhāṣya	MATICANDRA Daśa-padārtha-śāstra	
7th A.D.			UDDYOTAKARA Nyāya-Vārtika
8th A.D.			
9th A.D.	VĀCASPATI Tattva-Vaiśārādī		VĀCASPATI N.V. Tātparya-Ṭikā
10th A.D.		VYOMASIVA Vyomavati UDAYANA Kiraṇāvalī Lakṣaṇāvalī ŚRĪDHARA Nyāya-Kandali	BHĀSARVAJNA Nyāya-Sāra UDAYANA Nyāya-Kusumāñjali N.V.T. Pariśuddhi Nyāya-Pariśiṣṭa Ātmatattvaviveka Prabodha-Siddhi JAYANTA BHATTA Nyāya-Mañjari
11th A.D.		ŚIVĀDITYA Saptapadārthī	

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Abbrev.

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Abbrev.

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